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PREFACE
In response to Air Force Secretary James G. Roche’s charge to reinvigorate the systems
engineering profession, the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) undertook a broad
spectrum of initiatives that included creating new and innovative instructional material. The
Institute envisioned case studies on past programs as one of these new tools for teaching the
principles of systems engineering.
Four case studies, the first set in a planned series, were developed with the oversight of
the Subcommittee on Systems Engineering to the Air University Board of Visitors. The
Subcommittee includes the following distinguished individuals:
Chairman
Dr. Alex Levis, AF/ST
Members
Brigadier General Tom Sheridan, AFSPC/DR
Dr. Daniel Stewart, AFMC/CD
Dr. George Friedman, University of Southern California
Dr. Andrew Sage, George Mason University
Dr. Elliot Axelband, University of Southern California
Dr. Dennis Buede, Innovative Decisions Inc.
Dr. Dave Evans, Aerospace Institute
Dr. Levis and the Subcommittee on Systems Engineering crafted the idea of publishing
these case studies, reviewed several proposals, selected four systems as the initial cases for
study, and continued to provide guidance throughout their development. The Subcommittee’s
leading minds in systems engineering have been a guiding force to charter, review, and approve
the work of the authors. The four case studies produced in this series are the C-5 Galaxy, the F111, the Hubble Space Telescope, and the Theater Battle Management Core System.

Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited
The views expressed in this Case Study are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the
United States Government.
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FOREWORD
At the direction of the Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. James G. Roche, the Air Force
Institute of Technology (AFIT) established a Center for Systems Engineering (CSE) at its
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, campus in 2002. With academic oversight by a Subcommittee on
Systems Engineering, chaired by Air Force Chief Scientist Dr. Alex Levis, the CSE was tasked
to develop case studies focusing on the application of systems engineering principles within
various aerospace programs. At a May 2003 meeting, the Subcommittee reviewed several
proposals and selected the Hubble Telescope (space system), Theater Battle Management Core
System (complex software development), F-111 fighter (joint program with significant
involvement by the Office of the Secretary of Defense), and C-5 cargo airlifter (very large,
complex aircraft). The committee drafted an initial case outline and learning objectives, and
suggested the use of the Friedman-Sage Framework to guide overall analysis.
The CSE contracted for management support with Universal Technology Corporation
(UTC) in July 2003. Principal investigators for the four cases included Mr. John Griffin for the
C-5A, Dr. G. Keith Richey for the F-111, Mr. James Mattice for the Hubble Space Telescope,
and Mr. Josh Collens from The MITRE Corporation for the Theater Battle Management Core
System effort.
The Department of Defense continues to develop and acquire joint complex systems that
deliver needed capabilities demanded by our warfighters. Systems engineering is the technical
and technical management process that focuses explicitly on delivering and sustaining robust,
high-quality, affordable products. The Air Force leadership, from the Secretary of the Air Force,
to our Service Acquisition Executive, through the Commander of Air Force Materiel Command,
has collectively stated the need to mature a sound systems engineering process throughout the
Air Force.
These cases will support academic instruction on systems engineering within military
service academies and at both civilian and military graduate schools. Plans exist for future case
studies focusing on other areas. Suggestions have included various munitions programs, Joint
service programs, logistics-led programs, science and technology/laboratory efforts, additional
aircraft programs such as the B-2 bomber, and successful commercial systems.
As we uncovered historical facts and conducted key interviews with program managers
and chief engineers, both within the government and those working for the various prime and
subcontractors, we concluded that systems programs face similar challenges today. Applicable
systems engineering principles and the effects of communication and the environment continue
to challenge our ability to provide a balanced technical solution. We look forward to your
comments on this case study and the others that follow.

MARK K. WILSON, SES
Director, Center for Systems Engineering
Air Force Institute of Technology
http://cse.afit.edu/
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The C-5 Systems Engineering Case Study captures the untold story of the application of
systems engineering during the concept exploration, development, and production of the USAF
C-5A and C-5B aircraft. The case study examines and dissects the systems engineering process
as applied by the Air Force C-5 System Program Office and the prime contractor, Lockheed,
Georgia, from the program’s genesis in 1957 to the last delivery of the C-5A and the beginning
of the C-5B program in 1973. Numerous interviews were conducted with the principals who
managed and directed the program and a story of the systems engineering process was
developed. The case study traces the program’s systems engineering process in translating a
vision into 125 cargo transport aircraft that have served our nation proudly for the last 35 years.
A description of the program is essential to orient students to the size of the aircraft and
the magnitude of the program and thus enable them to appreciate the systems engineering
process and how it was applied. When the C-5 aircraft first entered the inventory in 1970, it was
the largest aircraft in the world, and it is still the largest transport cargo aircraft in our inventory.
It was the first of the behemoths. Figure 1 shows the dimensions of the aircraft and helps give a
perspective of its size.

Figure 1. Three View Drawing of the C-5A Aircraft [1]
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The success of the C-5 transport aircraft is underscored by the performance of the fleet as
an operational system and its heavy lift support in all of our conflicts from Vietnam to Iraq. It
still accomplishes tasks that no other military aircraft, such as the new C-17 or any derivative of
commercial cargo aircraft, can perform, and has consistently carried more cargo than any other
aircraft in the time of war. With a towering six-story “T” tail and a unique knight’s visor
forward-loading door, this gigantic aircraft is capable of carrying two of the heaviest Army tanks
and their related equipment, or three CH 47 Chinook helicopters. The front and aft ramps
facilitate easy drive-on, drive-off loading of military vehicles and equipment.
The aircraft is capable of carrying heavy, outsized cargo in a cargo bay that measures
19.5 feet wide by 13.5 feet high by 120 feet long. The weight and performance of the aircraft is
shown in Table 1.
Table 1. C-5A Weight and Performance Capabilities [1]
Weight Capability
764,000 pounds (1)
840,000 pounds (2)
920,000 pounds (3)
265,000 pounds (4)
335,000 pounds
635,850 pounds
Performance Capability
440 knots at 30,000 feet

Design Weight

Max payload
Max fuel
Max landing weight

Cruise performance
Airport performance
Takeoff
8,000 feet at maximum gross weight
Landing
4,000 feet with 100,000 pounds cargo
(1) at 2.25 g
(2) with the new wing
(3) in flight limit after refueling
(4) with the new wing

The systems engineering process was essential to the development of the C-5. The case
study will describe the application of systems engineering from the initial phase of development
and documentation of the system requirements, through the proposal phase, and during the
design and development, testing, and production. The study will detail the success of the
systems engineering process to show an appreciation of the process used then and permit
comparison as a benchmark against today’s processes. Additionally, it will analyze the failures
of the C-5A program that fueled the controversy surrounding the program during its
development. The role of systems engineering in the two most significant controversies – the
cost overrun and the ineffective wing and pylon designs – will be presented. The reader will be
exposed to the decisions made and the decisions not made, and to the unintended consequences
that arose from these events.
The systems engineering process and its unique application to the C-5 program will be
examined by developing four fundamental learning principles (LPs) from the program. These
learning principles will be analyzed, dissected, and discussed in detail to allow the reader to
appreciate the circumstances surrounding the systems engineers, the program managers, and
senior leadership. These learning principles are the basic lessons that most graphically highlight
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the core features or dominant factors that influence the outcome of the program. For the C-5,
they are:
LP 1, Requirements. The process for developing and documenting the system
performance requirements integrated the User (warfighter), planners, developers,
and technologists from both the government and industry in a coordinated set of
trade studies. It resulted in a well-balanced, well-understood set of requirements
that fundamentally remained unchanged throughout the program.
LP 2, Total Package Procurement Concept (TPPC). The Total Package Procurement
Concept (TPPC) employed by the government required a fixed-price, incentive
fee contract for the design, development, and production of 58 aircraft. It
included a clause giving Total Systems Performance Responsibility (TSPR) to the
prime contractor. TPPC was invented to control costs, but it was the underlying
cause of the cost overrun and limited the number of aircraft purchased under the
original contract.
LP 3, Weight Empty Guarantee. A Weight Empty Guarantee was included in the
specification as a performance requirement and in the contract as a cost penalty
for overweight conditions of delivered aircraft. The aircraft Weight Empty
Guarantee dominated the traditional aircraft performance requirements (range,
payload, etc.), increased costs, and resulted in a major shortfall in the wing and
pylon fatigue life. The stipulation of a Weight Empty Guarantee as a performance
requirement had far-reaching and significantly deleterious unintended
consequences.
LP 4, Independent Review Teams (IRTs). The Air Force C-5 Systems Program
Office employed Independent Review Teams (IRTs) to assemble national experts
to examine the program and provide recommendations to the government. These
problem-solving teams were convened to garner the best advice in particular
technical areas: structure design and technology, and designs to achieve useful
service life.
The development of the learning principles was an iterative and maturing process.
Initially, a set of learning principles was postulated from the author’s experience and knowledge
of the program. As interviews were conducted with key people, the list of lessons was narrowed
for the first draft. The AFIT Systems Engineering Subcommittee reviewed the draft and the list
evolved. After the final list of learning principles was developed, the Friedman-Sage[2]
assessment tool was used to examine the context of all the learning principles and their effect on
the program. The Friedman-Sage construct and its associated matrix of nine Concept Domains
and Three Responsibility Domains gives the systems engineering practitioner a powerful tool to
examine any program’s systems engineering progress and identify areas of risk. A description of
the tool, along with other key items that underpin the case study, will be found in the six
appendices.
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1.0
1.1
1.1.1

SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES
General Systems Engineering Process
Introduction

The Department of Defense continues to develop and acquire joint systems and to deliver
needed capabilities to the warfighter. With a constant objective to improve and mature the
acquisition process, it continues to pursue new and creative methodologies to purchase these
technically complex systems. A sound systems engineering process, focused explicitly on
delivering and sustaining robust, high-quality, affordable products that meet the needs of
customers and stake holders must continue to evolve and mature. Systems engineering is the
technical and technical management process that results in delivered products and systems that
exhibit the best balance of cost and performance. The process must operate effectively with
desired mission-level capabilities, establish system-level requirements, allocate these down to the
lowest level of the design, and ensure validation and verification of performance, meeting cost
and schedule constraints. The systems engineering process changes as the program progresses
from one phase to the next, as do the tools and procedures. The process also changes over the
decades, maturing, expanding, growing, and evolving from the base established during the
conduct of past programs. Systems engineering has a long history. Examples can be found
demonstrating a systemic application of effective engineering and engineering management, as
well as poorly applied, but well defined processes. Throughout the many decades during which
systems engineering has emerged as a discipline, many practices, processes, heuristics, and tools
have been developed, documented, and applied.
Several core lifecycle stages have surfaced as consistently and continually challenging
during any system program development. First, system development must proceed from a welldeveloped set of requirements. Regardless of overall waterfall or evolutionary acquisition
approach, the system requirements must flow down to all subsystems and lower level
components. System requirements need to be stable, balanced and must properly reflect all
activities in all intended environments.
Next, the system planning and analysis occur with important tradeoffs and a baseline
architecture developed. These architectural artifacts can depict any legacy system modifications,
introduction of new technologies and overall system-level behavior and performance. Modeling
and simulation are generally employed to organize and assess alternatives at this introductory
stage. System and subsystem design follows the functional architecture. Either newer objectoriented analysis and design or classic structured analysis using functional decomposition and
information flows/ data modeling occurs. Design proceeds logically using key design reviews,
tradeoff analysis, and prototyping to reduce any high-risk technology areas.
Important to the efficient decomposition and creation of the functional and physical
architectural designs are the management of interfaces and integration of subsystems. This is
applied to subsystems within a system, or across large, complex systems of systems. Once a
solution is planned, analyzed, designed and constructed, validation and verification take place to
ensure satisfaction of requirements. Definition of test criteria, measures of effectiveness (MOEs)
and measures of performance (MOPs), established as part of the requirements process well
before any component/ subsystem assembly, takes place.
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There are several excellent representations of the systems engineering process presented
in the literature. These depictions present the current state of the art in the maturity and
evolution of the systems engineering process. One can find systems engineering process
definitions, guides and handbooks from the International Council on Systems Engineering
(INCOSE), European Industrial Association (EIA), Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE), and various Department of Defense (DoD) agencies and organizations. They
show the process as it should be applied by today’s experienced practitioner. One of these
processes, long used by the Defense Acquisition University (DAU), is depicted by Figure 1-1. It
should be noted that this model is not accomplished in a single pass. Alternatively, it is an
iterative and nested process that gets repeated at low and lower levels of definition and design.

Figure 1-1. The Systems Engineering Process as Presented by the
Defense Acquisition University
1.1.2

Evolving Systems Engineering Process

The DAU model, like all others, has been documented in the last two decades, and has
expanded and developed to reflect a changing environment. Systems are becoming increasingly
complex internally and more interconnected externally. The process used to develop the aircraft
and systems of the past was a process effective at the time. It served the needs of the
practitioners and resulted in many successful systems in our inventory. Notwithstanding, the
cost and schedule performance of the past programs are fraught with examples of some wellmanaged programs and ones with less stellar execution. As the nation entered the 1980s and
1990s, large DoD and commercial acquisitions were overrunning costs and behind schedule.
The aerospace industry and its organizations were becoming larger and were more
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geographically and culturally distributed. The systems engineering process, as applied within the
confines of a single system and a single company, is no longer the norm.
Today, many factors overshadow new acquisition, including system-of-systems (SoS)
context, network centric warfare and operations, and the rapid growth in information technology.
These factors have driven a new form of emergent systems engineering, which focuses on certain
aspects of our current process. One of these increased areas of focus resides in the architectural
definitions used during system analysis. This process will be differentiated by greater reliance
on reusable, architectural views describing the system context and concept of operations,
interoperability, information and data flows and network service-oriented characteristics. The
DoD has recently made these architectural products, described in the DoD Architectural
Framework (DoDAF), mandatory to enforce this new architecture-driven systems engineering
process throughout the acquisition lifecycle.
1.1.3

Case Studies

The systems engineering process to be used in today’s complex system-of-systems
projects is a process matured and founded on the principles of systems developed in the past.
The examples of systems engineering used on other programs, both past and present, provide a
wealth of lessons to be used in applying and understanding today’s process. It was this thinking
that led to the construction of the four case studies released in this series.
The purpose of developing detailed case studies is to support the teaching of systems
engineering principles. They will facilitate learning by emphasizing to the student the long-term
consequences of the systems engineering and programmatic decisions on program success. The
systems engineering case studies will assist in discussion of both successful and unsuccessful
methodologies, processes, principles, tools, and decision material to assess the outcome of
alternatives at the program/system level. In addition, the importance of using skills from
multiple professions and engineering disciplines and collecting, assessing, and integrating varied
functional data will be emphasized. When they are taken together, the student is provided realworld, detailed examples of how the process attempts to balance cost, schedule and performance.
The utilization and mis-utilization of systems engineering learning principles will be
highlighted, with special emphasis on the conditions that foster and impede good systems
engineering practice. Case studies should be used to illustrate both good and bad examples of
acquisition management and learning principles, to include whether:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Every system provides a balanced and optimized product to a customer
Effective Requirements analysis was applied
Consistent and rigorous application of systems engineering Management standards
was applied
Effective Test planning was accomplished
There were effective major Technical program reviews
Continuous Risk assessments and management was implemented
There were reliable Cost estimates and policies
They used disciplined application of Configuration Management
A well defined System boundary was defined
They used disciplined methodologies for complex systems
Problem solving incorporated understanding of the System within bigger environment
(customer’s customer)
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The systems engineering process transforms an operational need into a set of system
elements. These system elements are allocated and translated by the systems engineering
process into detailed requirements. The systems engineering process, from the identification of
the need to the development and utilization of the product, must continuously integrate and
balance the requirements, cost, and schedule to provide an operationally effective system
throughout its life cycle. Case studies should also highlight the various interfaces and
communications to achieve this optimization, which include:
•

•
•

The program manager/systems engineering interface essential between the
operational user and developer (acquirer) to translate the needs into the performance
requirements for the system and subsystems.
The government/contractor interface essential for the practice of systems engineering
to translate and allocate the performance requirements into detailed requirements.
The developer (acquirer)/User interface within the project, essential for the systems
engineering practice of integration and balance.

The systems engineering process must manage risk, both known and unknown, as well as
both internal and external. This objective will specifically capture those external factors and the
impact of these uncontrollable influences, such as actions of Congress, changes in funding, new
instructions/policies, changing stakeholders or user requirements or contractor and government
staffing levels.
Lastly, the systems engineering process must respond to “Mega-Trends” in the systems
engineering discipline itself, as the nature of systems engineering and related practices do vary
with time.
1.1.4

Framework for Analysis

The case studies will be presented in a format that follows the learning principles
specifically derived for the program, but will utilize the Friedman-Sage framework to organize
the assessment of the application of the systems engineering process. The framework and the
derived matrix can play an important role in developing case studies in systems engineering and
systems management, especially case studies that involve systems acquisition. The framework
presents a nine row by three column matrix shown in Table 1-1.
Table 1-1. A Framework of Key Systems Engineering Concepts and Responsibilities
Concept Domain
1. Contractor
Responsibility
A. Requirements Definition and
Management
B. Systems Architecting and
Conceptual Design
C. System and Subsystem Detailed
Design and Implementation
D. Systems and Interface Integration
E. Validation and Verification
F. Deployment and Post Deployment
G. Life Cycle Support
H. Risk Assessment and Management
I.
System and Program Management
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Responsibility Domain
2. Shared
Responsibility

3. Government
Responsibility

Six of the nine concept domain areas in Table 1-1 represent phases in the systems
engineering lifecycle:
A. Requirements Definition and Management
B. Systems Architecting and Conceptual Design
C. Detailed System and Subsystem Design and Implementation
D. Systems and Interface Integration
E. Validation and Verification
F. System Deployment and Post Deployment
Three of the nine concept areas represent necessary process and systems management
support:
G. Life Cycle Support
H. Risk management
I. System and Program Management
While other concepts could be have been identified, the Framework suggests these nine
are the most relevant to systems engineering in that they cover the essential life cycle processes
in systems acquisition and the systems management support in the conduct of the process. Most
other concept areas that were identified during the development of the matrix appear to be
subsets of one of these. The three columns of this two-dimensional framework represent the
responsibilities and perspectives of government and contractor, and the shared responsibilities
between the government and the contractor.
The important feature of the Friedman-Sage framework is the matrix. The systems
engineering case studies published by AFIT employ the Friedman-Sage construct and matrix as
the baseline assessment tools to evaluate the conduct of the systems engineering process for the
topic program. The Friedman Sage matrix is not a unique systems engineering applications tool
per se, but rather a disciplined approach to evaluate the systems engineering process, tools, and
procedures as applied to a program.
The Friedman-Sage matrix is based on two major premises as the founding objectives:
•

In teaching systems engineering, case studies can be instructive in that they relate
aspects of the real world to the student to provide valuable program experience and
professional practice to academic theory.

In teaching systems engineering in DoD, there has previously been a little distinction
between duties and responsibilities of the government and industry activities. More often than
not, the government role in systems engineering is the role as the requirements developer.
1.2

C-5A Learning Principles

The programs of the past can provide today’s systems engineering practitioners with
valuable insight into the methods used by our predecessors in developing our heritage aircraft.
The success of these systems can be traced to the systems engineering process, which, while
different from the processes of today, resemble them in many ways. The C-5A fleet has
5

demonstrated success in operation, but, as will be discussed, the development of the aircraft was
plagued by a major technical failure in the design of the structure, most notably the wing and
pylon. The fatigue or service life led to initial operational restrictions and required a complete
new wing to be designed and retrofitted to the original aircraft. The program’s cost overrun was
also a major contentious issue starting in 1966 and lasting for the life of the program. The
application of the systems engineering process and its role in the program successes and failures
will be traced from concept exploration to the delivery of the 81st C-5A model in May 1973.
The C-5 learning principles are:
LP 1, Requirements. The process for developing and documenting the system
performance requirements integrated the User (warfighter), planners, developers,
and technologists from both the government and industry in a coordinated set of
trade studies. It resulted in a well-balanced, well-understood set of requirements
that fundamentally remained unchanged throughout the program.
LP 2, Total Package Procurement Concept (TPPC). The Total Package Procurement
Concept (TPPC) employed by the government required a fixed-price, incentive
fee contract for the design, development, and production of 58 aircraft. It
included a clause giving Total Systems Performance Responsibility (TSPR) to the
prime contractor. TPPC was invented to control costs, but it was the underlying
cause of the cost overrun and limited the number of aircraft purchased under the
original contract.
LP 3, Weight Empty Guarantee. A Weight Empty Guarantee was included in the
specification as a performance requirement and in the contract as a cost penalty
for overweight conditions of delivered aircraft. The aircraft Weight Empty
Guarantee dominated the traditional aircraft performance requirements (range,
payload, etc.), increased costs, and resulted in a major shortfall in the wing and
pylon fatigue life. The stipulation of a Weight Empty Guarantee as a performance
requirement had far-reaching and significantly deleterious unintended
consequences.
LP 4, Independent Review Teams (IRTs). The Air Force C-5 Systems Program
Office employed Independent Review Teams (IRTs) to assemble national experts
to examine the program and provide recommendations to the government. These
problem-solving teams were convened to garner the best advice in particular
technical areas: structure design and technology, and designs to achieve useful
service life.
1.2.1

C-5A Friedman Sage Matrix

Table 1-2 shows the Friedman-Sage matrix for the C-5 and the four entries in the matrix
most representative of the four learning principles. C-5 Learning Principle 1, Requirements, is
clearly represented by the first row of the concept domain, Requirements Definition and
Management. The case study will follow the systems engineering process used to define the
requirements and document them in the system specification, as well as the contractor’s process
for allocating the functional requirements to the design requirements. While at the beginning of
the requirements process the bulk of the responsibility lies with the customer, the responsibility
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for requirements definition shared between the contractor and the government is also a vital part
of the process.
C-5 Learning Principle 2, Total Package Procurement Concept (TPPC), falls primarily at
the intersection of system and program management and into the government’s responsibility,
but, again, this decision process spans all three responsibility domains. While it was the
government’s responsibility to select the contract type, there is implied responsibility on the part
of the contractor to assess the risk in accomplishing the contract and a shared responsibility to
derive the pros and cons of contemplated contract strategies. This proved particularly significant
for the C-5, as will be shown. The contract type stipulated by TPPC also affected the system
design of the third row, first column, which is primarily a contractor responsibility.
C-5 Learning Principle 3, Weight Empty Guarantee, heavily influenced the systems
engineering process and is representative of a contractor responsibility (third row, first column).
It also dominated the Validation and Verification row, particularly the shared responsibility,
because of the negative impact of weight and its impact on reduced service life, all of which was
discovered during full scale testing late in the program cycle.
C-5 Learning Principle 4, Independent Review Teams (IRTs) employed by the Air Force
SPO was dominant in the Validation and Verification row, middle column, shared responsibility
only because of the specific of use of IRTs for the C-5. The use of IRTs is a vital function of
SPOs in general and therefore would usually be noted as a Systems and Program Management
function of the Friedman Sage matrix. It will be highlighted in both the locations of the matrix
for the C-5 because the SPO convened IRTs to solve a specific problem that applied to
Validation and Verification of the new wing design. The entry in the matrix under the shared
responsibility reflects that the team was populated by national experts and also by members of
the contractor’s design team and personnel from the Air Force SPO.
Table 1-2. Friedman Sage Matrix with C-5 Learning Principles [2]
Concept Domain
1. SE Contractor
Responsibility
A.

Requirements Definition and Management

B.

D.
E.

Systems Architecting and Conceptual
Design
System and Subsystem Detailed Design
and Implementation
Systems and Interface Integration
Validation and Verification

F.
G.
H.
I.

Deployment and Post Deployment
Life Cycle Support
Risk Assessment and Management
System and Program Management

C.

Responsibility Domain
2. Shared Responsibility

3. Government
Responsibility
LP 1
Requirements

LP 3, Weight Empty
Guarantee
LP 4 Independent Review
Teams

LP 4 Independent Review
Teams

LP 2, TPPC

As noted, the three columns of this two-dimensional concept framework represent the
responsibility domain and perspectives of the government and the contractor, respectively, and
responsibilities shared by the government and the contractor. The complete systems engineering
process for the C-5A program is shown in matrix form in Appendix 1 to illustrate the application
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of the framework and matrix for this case study. The four learning principles and the highlighted
boxes of the matrix will organize the data and discussion in the body of this case study.
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2.0

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

The C-5A cargo aircraft was conceived in the early 1950s by senior leadership in the U.S.
Air Force and the Military Air Transport Service (MATS). It was becoming increasingly clear
that the nation would be engaged in conflicts arising in distant locations, and senior military
planners contemplated methods to employ forces that could quickly stop an advancing enemy.
They envisioned a very large cargo/transport aircraft capable of carrying the heaviest of the
Army M-60 tanks, large bulky cargo such as the Chinook CH-47 helicopter, and other heavy
Army equipment for extremely long distances. The aircraft was to be part of a family of jet
engine-powered platforms that would transport an entire Army division to the war front. Figure
2-1 shows the vehicle three-view.

Figure 2-1. C-5 Three-View [1]
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Table 2-1 shows the performance characteristics of the aircraft.
Table 2-1. C-5A Weight and Performance Capabilities
Weight Capability
764,000 pounds (1)
840,000 pounds (2)
920,000 pounds (3)
265,000 pounds (4)
335,000 pounds
635,850 pounds
Performance Capability
440 knots at 30,000 feet

Design Weight

Max payload
Max fuel
Max landing weight

Cruise performance
Airport performance
Takeoff
8,000 feet at maximum gross weight
Landing
4,000 feet with 100,000 pounds cargo
(1) at 2.25 g
(2) with the new wing
(3) in flight limit after refueling
(4) with the new wing

2.1

Cargo Loading Features

The aft cargo bay doors and the forward knight’s visor nose allow for drive-on and driveoff loading capabilities. Additionally, the fore and aft sections of the aircraft have loading ramps
that can be positioned to truck bed height. A further complementary feature that facilitates ease
of cargo loading is the unique kneeling landing gear, which can position the aircraft height from
the normal taxi height of 113 inches down to 79 inches above the ground. The aft cargo doors
can also be opened in flight for airdrop missions, allowing aerial delivery of pallets weighing up
to 50,000 pounds. The aft paratrooper doors are located on each side of the cargo compartment.
The C-5A with landing gear set at its lowest level, raised visor, and opened aft ramp doors is
shown in Figure 2-2.
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Figure 2-2. C-5A Loading and Unloading Equipment
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3.0

C-5 SYSTEMS ENGINEERING LEARNING PRINCIPLES

Table 3-1 shows the key events of the time frame covered by the case study for the C-5
program. The C-5A and C-5B continue today as active inventory aircraft and are even funded
for modernization. Two programs, Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) and Reliability
Enhancement Re-Engine Program (RERP), are ongoing and summarized in Appendix 6.
Table 3-1. Key C-5 Milestones
Concept Exploration
Mission Effectiveness/Operational Anal
Contractor Teams Assembled
TPPC Evolution
AF SPO Cadre Established
Systems Design and Dev’t
Contractor Conceptual Design Trades
RFP Release
Contractor submits proposal
Contractor Proposal Evaluation by AF
Contractor Initial Debriefs
Lockheed Announced as C-5 Winner
Weight Growth/Drag Increase
SPO Cure Notice
First SPO IRT
First Fatigue Test Results
First Flight
Defense Advisory Group
ASC IRT
Flight Restrictions on C-5A
Production of C-5A
Last (81st) C-5A Delivered
Initial Operational Capability
New Wing Design start
First C-5A Wing Modification
First C-5B Delivered
Last C-5A Wing Modification

1957–1963 LP 1, Requirements
1957–1963
1961–1963
1963–1965 LP 2, TPPC
1964
1964–1972
1961–1964
Dec 1964
20 April 1965
April 1965-Sept 1965 LP 3, Weight empty
Sept 1965
Sept 1965
Dec 1965-Jan 1967
Feb 1967
1967 LP 4, Independent Review Teams
June 1968–Dec 1972
28 June 1968
1969
1969–1971
1969–1987
19671973
May 1973
June 1970
Jan 1976
June 1981
Sept 1985
May 1987

The learning principles are shown in shorthand notation in the table to show when they
first surfaced. This table will be a handy reference to the reader during the discussions of the
learning principles in the text in Sections 3.2 through 3.5 to keep dates and events in the proper
chronological order.
Lockheed Management Process
The technical and management staff on the C-5A program at Lockheed involved
themselves in the systems engineering and system integration process on a daily basis.
Lockheed managed interfaces were managed within the company using interface control
documents and subcontractor interfaces using interface control drawings developed through joint
working groups. The two primary management techniques were (1) an informal process
perfected over the years by the professional staff, who had developed two operational aircraft
together, and (2) a formal process managed by the chief engineer and the program manager.
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The formal process worked exceptionally well. Every Wednesday, at the 7:00 a.m. chief
engineer’s meeting, each aspect of the design, integration, schedule, and systems engineering
process was reviewed. It was imperative that the principal who presented the information be
prepared and that there be no open actions with unresolved closure plans.
One particularly illustrative anecdote involved a schedule review. The schedule manager
presented a list of over 500 tasks that were to be accomplished that week. The manager reported
that all items were on track except for some small number of items. Of the late items, most had
been resolved and there was a plan to finish the work and get back on schedule. For those
unresolved items for which there was no current work-around, the names of the engineers
responsible for correcting these problems were shown. On Thursday, the chief engineer visited
the desks of the engineers and all the problems had been resolved! [1, 5 (numerous interviews)].
The Lockheed systems engineering process was fundamental to the functioning of the
design team. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was commonplace for a design team to stay relatively
intact within a company. The C-5A design engineers had worked together for years at the
Lockheed facility at Marietta, Georgia, and knew each other well. The core design team,
especially the senior subsystem engineers, grew up using the Marietta division’s internal
procedures and were mentored by those who perfected the processes. The team had experience
on numerous developments and knew each other’s strengths and weakness. Coordination and
integration formed part of the basic design process, so procedures were followed automatically. 1
Thus, the Lockheed process had formal procedures, tools, and processes that were well defined,
completely documented, and taught to all the team members; although their number and extent
were less than those of today’s systems engineering baseline. The informal systemic process
used by the engineering, production, and management teams for the C-5A pervaded the industry
teams and, therefore, integration was part of the basic work pattern.
The Air Force contract with Lockheed required the use of a PERT-TIME format to
control the schedule [1]. This was the premier scheduling tool available at the time, but the
systems engineering process within Lockheed required a much more detailed schedule
methodology to track the many thousands of design and manufacturing details. Lockheed’s
scheduling system carried over 200,000 events, yet allowed flexibility in rescheduling items
under individual control. When two groups negotiated a change to the schedule, the schedule
monitors were so advised and entered the new schedule into the computer program, which was
then made available to the engineers and managers.
Risk Assessment and Management
The risk management process used by Lockheed during the development phase was a
subset of the systems engineering process and was conducted exceptionally well using the
inherent workings of the systems engineering and design process systemic to the design teams
resident at Lockheed Marietta. Systems engineering sub-processes, such as technical
performance measurement and tracking, earned value, PERT-TIME schedule, etc., were
conducted on a daily basis through the established relationships between and among the
professional staff who had worked together on previous programs, such as the C-130 and C-141.

1

Today, it is rare to find an experienced, complete company team that has performed three to five designs.
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Each of the design groups was assigned the responsibility to identify risks, develop risk
mitigation plans, and ensure that technical disciplines that would be affected by, or could affect,
the risk, were included in the risk solutions. This responsibility included logistics,
manufacturing, and operations. The chief engineer and all those who reported directly to him
reviewed risks at the weekly chief engineer’s staff meeting. The Wednesday morning meeting
was the forum for presenting risk, reviewing the mitigation plan, and providing guidance,
corrective action, and approval from the collective staff. These meetings were extremely
important and the principals seldom missed them.
The program manager meeting was also held weekly. Everyone who reported directly to
the program attended this meeting, which featured the same review process and discipline used
in the chief engineer’s meeting. The program manager was also shown the results of the systems
engineering process and tracking of technical performance measures as a metric for progress of
the design team.
The government System Program Office (SPO) delegated the risk identification and
mitigation process to its engineers, manufacturing personnel, logisticians, and other professional
disciplines. The staff within the SPO could review, monitor, and track the contractor’s progress
and assess the contractor’s ability to meet the specification requirements. The procedure
involved advising program management of the SPO’s assessment of risk.
Flight Testing
The first flight of the C-5A occurred on 28 June 1968, 33 months after contract award,
and initiated an era of flight testing with the Air Force and contractor operating as a combined
flight test unit. The lesson in systems engineering, however, derives as much from the
preparation for flight testing as from the actual conduct of the flight testing. Lockheed assigned
Mr. David Dickenson at the Marietta facility to oversee flight testing [5]. He immediately
configured a flight test team from the company that included representatives from all of the
relevant disciplines: engineering, configuration management, ground testing, manufacturing,
and flight operations. This multifaceted, multidisciplinary team was able to conduct all ground
testing prior to the actual flight test using experienced people, all of whom played a key role in
their respective technical disciplines throughout the design and production of the aircraft.
During the early engine runs, a special test facility was constructed at the contractor’s
facility and was staffed by both Lockheed and General Electric (GE) personnel. This facilitated
early testing and troubleshooting and was instrumental in achieving a mature design for the
engine prior to first flight. The ground vibration tests were also accomplished at the Marietta
facility, with many of the engineers who designed the structure assisting in test setup and data
reduction.
3.1

C-5 Learning Principle 1: Requirements

The first, and arguably most important, phase of the systems engineering process used in
the C-5A program defined and documented the system requirements. Achieving a balance
between the required operational performance and the design risk, within the associated cost and
the stipulated schedule, was a major accomplishment. The process will be discussed so that the
student can evaluate the methods used and the soundness of the approach compared to more
modern applications of the requirements process.
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Requirements Definition and Management
Requirements definition for the C-5A was a complete process in that it included all the
necessary participants and integrated their inputs. It employed the systems engineering tools for
mission effectiveness/operational analysis available at the time – the forerunners of today’s
modeling and simulation tools. Starting with the statement of the top-level functional goal,
“move an Army division from CONUS to a distant location,” the project team developed the
lower level functional requirements. Drawing on the combined and integrated experience of the
government users, operators, engineers, development planners, and technologists, as well as on
the engineering design, conceptual analysis, and manufacturing capability of the aerospace
industry, the systems engineering process balanced the user’s needs with current design
capability. The organizations cooperated, exchanged data, and debated alternatives,
continuously narrowing the choices and communicating the evolving baseline to all team
members [5 (Lusczek, Dvorscak)].
Communications
The C-5 systems engineering requirements process was designed to incorporate
communication in all directions: upward to the systems management team, across to ensure
integration of the user’s needs during design and integration among the technical disciplines, and
down to allocate requirements to the designers. The methods used to communicate requirements
and issues among the operational user, the SPO, and Lockheed provide an excellent heuristic for
predicting success. This phase of the systems engineering process culminated in a balanced,
achievable, and integrated set of requirements that were fully understood by all parties, and that
remained stable throughout the development of the aircraft. The C-5A program accomplished
this task in a textbook manner. The organizations involved in requirements derivation are
graphically depicted in Figure 3-1.

Communication 1961-1963
Influences
Vietnam
Century Series Fighter Cost
Military/Industrial Complex
F-111 Program

Congress
Industry
DoD
McNamara
HQ AF
Secretary
AF/I&L

Boeing
Douglas
Lockheed

AFSC/ASC
Program
Management
Initial SPO
Cadre

Air Force
Research
Laboratories

ASC
Development
Planning

Army
Needs

MATS
Operational Systems
C-133
C-124
C-130
C-119
C-141

Figure 3-1. Operational Mission Analysis and Communications
During Concept Exploration
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The overlapping circles in Figure 3-1 are very important because they depict the
hierarchy in the systems engineering leadership. This changed with time. For the concept
exploration phase and during the mission effectiveness/operational analysis, the development
planning organization led the process. During the design and development phase, the Air Force
SPO was the dominant organization, but it led only the processes for which it was primarily
responsible, while Lockheed served as lead for the contractor’s primary processes. This
underscores the importance of using the Friedman-Sage matrix to sort and define responsibilities
as well as tasks. It is vital to understanding the organizational communications process for any
program at the various phases.
The Air Research and Development Center (ARDC) – the forerunner organization of the
Deputy for Development Planning at the Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) at WrightPatterson Air Force Base (WPAFB) – solicited and integrated the inputs from the stakeholders of
the other organizations. External influences from two sources were integrated into the trade
study process. The first of the external factors is indicated by the group of three entities depicted
on the left side of Figure 3-1, all of which interacted with each other as indicated by the curved
arrows. This group was instrumental because it influenced the Air Force leadership, which in
turn provided program direction, as depicted by the arrow from the AF Secretary’s office to Air
Force Systems Command (AFSC). The second set of external influences came from the national
and worldwide situations that existed at the time.
The communication between and among all the people in the stakeholder organizations
on the right-hand side of the figure was excellent from the beginning of the program [5 (Ormsby,
Goldfarb)]. This cooperative working relationship and an environment of open sharing persisted
throughout all levels of the program, even during the height of the controversies over cost and
weight.
Operational Effectiveness/Mission Analysis
Operational effectiveness/mission analysis studies represented the first steps in the
systems engineering requirements process [3,4]. The purpose of this phase of the process was to
develop a balanced set of achievable requirements, well within the current reach of state-of-theart technology. The systems engineering process assessed the User’s needs, determined whether
the available technology was sufficiently mature to produce a practical design, evaluated the
prime contractor’s engineering/manufacturing capabilities, and performed operational mission
effectiveness assessments.
Operational effectiveness/mission analysis studies covered range, payload, speed, and
airport conditions, both at takeoff and landing. The entire cargo/transport aircraft community,
the contractors, the development planners, the users, and the technologists were deeply involved
in the assessment process. It resulted in the publication of the MATS Qualitative Operational
Requirements (QOR) in October 1961 [1] and the System Operational Requirements (SOR) 214
for Heavy Lift Logistics Weapon System on 25 March 1964, and the release of the RFP in
December 1965. Note that the whole process took seven years, starting with the early vision, to
build the program consensus, develop the budget plan, and define the requirements.
The operational mission analysis was conducted under the direction of the major
command, Air Material Command (AMC). Under AMC, the Air Research and Development
Command (ARDC) was organized to include the Wright Air Development Center (WADC),
which was responsible for all research and development procurement, including weapon
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systems. WADC included a Plans office under the direction of Mr. Fred D. Orazio, Sr. [3]. The
Air Force organizational structure that existed prior to the Packard Commission of the early
1980s and the Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986 assigned responsibility for development planning
for air systems within WADC (later Aeronautical Systems Division from April 1961 to July
1992, and Aeronautical Systems Center from July 1992 to the present). Led by WADC from
1956 to 1959, the Deputy for Development Planning initiated design studies and operational
analysis to develop a range of vehicle sizes and missions various sized aircraft could accomplish.
WADC assessed the state of the art of technology relative to the top functional
requirement of moving an Army division and their heavy equipment to a distant location. At one
end of the spectrum was the current air transport fleet and the Navy ships. The maximum
requirement at the other extreme would be to move the division in one trip halfway around the
world. The initial studies examined the Air Force fleet size and the rather simple task of
managing the receiving airport with the influx of Air Force airplanes and Army equipment. The
second task was to study the locations of potential conflicts and the nation’s ability to operate
from bases close to those locations.
Given the worldwide operating capacity of the United States, the maximum distance to
move the Army division was estimated at 10,000 nautical miles. This could be done in one trip
of 10,000 miles by the transport fleet, with the attendant implications for the aircraft size to fly
that far unrefueled, or within some number of refuelings. The trade studies eventually concluded
that one refueling would be the most cost-effective solution. The requirement was then levied
for both air refueling and a mid-mission landing/refuel/takeoff from an austere location. This
latter requirement was a major driver for the design of the leading-edge and trailing-edge lift
system and caused Lockheed to spend a greater number of engineering hours than initially bid to
optimize the lift characteristics of the aircraft.
Derived Functional Requirements
The next step in developing derived architectural functions was planning for the
environment at the landing site. The operational experience of both MATS and the Army
dictated delivery of the equipment in close proximity to the front. The derived requirement to
operate at an austere forward location with an unimproved runway drove a requirement to
operate on a surface with a California Bearing Ratio (CBR) of 9 2 [1]. This produced a derived
requirement for a high flotation landing gear configuration and defined the number, type, and
size of the tires and wheels. The forward location also required anytime operation, which in turn
demanded operation in high crosswinds, assessed as 35 kts. This, in turn, derived a need for
crosswind gear capability, so the design incorporated landing gear bogies that could slue into the
wind. Since the austere location would have little or no support equipment, the landing gear was
complicated even more by incorporating a kneeling function to facilitate loading and unloading.
Systems engineering accurately highlighted the cost, weight, and risk to the landing gear design,
but despite this the User opted for the added complexity. Figure 3-2 shows the C-5A in its
landing configuration as the aircraft would approach an unprepared field.

2

The advertising brochures colloquially referred to this as the equivalent of a major league outfield surface
for the landing strip.
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Figure 3-2. C-5A Landing Gear Configuration
It should be noted that by the time the C-5B was designed in the late 1970s the user
realized that operating this precious asset on unprepared runways near the warfront was neither
prudent nor necessary, and the landing gear was somewhat simplified by removing the crosswind
feature. This reflected a change of operational philosophy with time and experience more than a
change from the original requirements. It was not cost effective to delete any of the other gear
functions, but certainly by the time the C-5B was built the high flotation requirement for the
landing gear would have been judged unnecessary. Had this been deleted from the original C-5A
requirements list, it would have resulted in a far simpler and lighter landing gear configuration.
During the early operational mission analysis studies, the team assessed the feasibility of
very large aircraft with takeoff weights as high as 3 million pounds. The purpose of studying
large aircraft was to assess the technology required to design and build such vehicles and to
assess the practicality of operating them in the real world [3, 5 (Lusczek)]. The study outcome
narrowed the range of the aircraft weight to between 650,000 and 750,000 pounds, a large
increase over the state of the art, but not a quantum leap over vehicles in the inventory or in
development during the mid-1960s.
The Army established a desired range of vehicles and equipment to be transported, which
included the largest tanks, fighting vehicles, and trucks in their inventory. This drove the
requirement to accommodate outsized cargo, which became the basis for the C-5. A requirement
for aerial delivery of both goods and paratroopers was stipulated, as was drive-on, drive-off
cargo capability at both loading and unloading airport locations.
MATS, the operators of the planned system, had significant experience with the current
strategic airlifter, the C-133. During the early requirements phase, MATS developed the
performance requirements necessary at both takeoff and landing airports. The cruise
performance and range were driven in large part by the ability of the C-141 to attain high cruise
speeds for MATS missions.
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Industry Involvement
The aerospace industry was involved in the early studies by providing assessments of
conceptual designs and the technology readiness levels of the system and subsystems. By 1961,
it was clear that the Air Force was committed to the C-X HLS – Cargo-Experimental, Heavy Lift
System, as it was originally known. The Air Force and MATS had released the QOR in October
1961 and industry competitors started assembling teams to develop their concepts and prepare
for the eventual competition to design and build the system. The three leaders in the
competition, Boeing, Douglas, and Lockheed, conducted numerous conceptual design trade
studies from 1961 to 1963. Lockheed, under the leadership of Robert Ormsby, performed
configuration assessments to see if a new and innovative configuration could be derived that
would provide a cost advantage and even capture the imagination of the customer (see Appendix
5 for a summary of the early systems engineering trade studies) [9]. Lockheed revisited and
reviewed the configuration studies they had performed during the early C-141 assessment and
found that the swept wing, “T” tail configuration remained the best overall approach to satisfy
the requirements that were coalescing from the operational mission analysis.
System Architecture Development
The C-5A system architecture resulted directly from the requirements process. As
previously noted, the top-level functional architecture statement was to move an Army division
to the point of a conventional conflict in a distant country. The architecture tree of functional
needs was derived from that need. The operational mission analysis continuously expanded the
requirements tree until a complete set of system functions, down to the lowest level, was
developed and documented. The features needed by the program were then made part of the
requirements and stipulated in the contractually required weapon system specification and the
subsystems specifications.
The weapon system specification and the subsystems specifications subsumed the
Military Specifications in effect at the time. The flying qualities were required per Mil F-8785.
The Mil Specs were modified as the mission dictated and incorporated in the specification tree.
For example, Mil F-8785 was augmented as a result of extensive ground-based, pilot-in-the-loop
simulator testing and pilot assessments of the responsiveness of such large, high-inertia vehicles.
One particularly difficult requirement in the original specification was to achieve a roll angle of
eight degrees in one second on powered approach. Flight simulations and flight test verification
in a C-135 showed that the aircraft would not need to achieve this angle to correct for navigation
errors after flying 5,500 nautical miles, breaking out from a 500-foot ceiling, and correcting the
flight path back to the runway. The specification was amended to include a more realistic and
perfectly adequate value of 5 degrees in the first second [5 (Sweeney, Ormsby)].
The contractor was required to show how they would implement the progressively
allocated functional requirements in a design. The government systems engineering process
tracked the ability of a design to meet the allocated functional baseline.
The Air Force mandated the use of the new AFSCM 375 manuals [7], volumes one
through five, for the C-5A. The manuals stipulated features, processes, tools, and procedures
that the contractor was required to employ during the design, development, and production of the
system. These requirements and mandates as to how to manage the program had a large cost
impact on the contractor, as the stipulations of the AFSCMs had to be addressed by specific
management actions.
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Requirements Management: SPO and Contractor
While Lockheed and the SPO used different systems engineering processes, they did
work together, because there was still only one weapon system that both processes acted upon.
The systems engineering process used by the SPO had the fundamental purpose of assessing how
changes in the requirements stipulated in the contractual baseline affected the design. The
systems engineering process operating within Lockheed’s design teams allocated the contractual
requirements of the system specification to the lowest level of the design. It was vital that the
process transmit the impact on the system to the entire design team from top to bottom, including
the subcontractors. Another essential feature of the process ensured horizontal, as well as a
vertical, allocation of the functional requirements. If a conflict could not be resolved within the
design, the prime contractor’s systems engineering process had a mechanism to refer the conflict
to the systems engineering process within the SPO for final resolution. The SPO or an authority
higher than the SPO then made final decision.
The major responsibilities of the SPO and the government were to develop and manage
requirements. They can be divided onto three areas:
•

Develop and document the initial requirements set for the top-level system
specification and the top-level system architecture.

•

Trade off specification requirements versus design risk during development.

•

Constrain requirements creep.

The Air Force SPO and Development Planning organization did an admirable job in
developing and documenting the requirements and ensuring they were balanced and attainable.
The SPO’s performance in exercising their responsibility to balance the requirements with the
design risk was less than stellar. The fear of reopening the fixed price contract with Lockheed
was a factor, as was the attitude of holding the contractor responsible for the contract they
signed.
Requirements were controlled exceptionally well during development. The problem that
most plagues both management and engineering groups is requirements creep, but the C-5
succeeded in avoiding this damage. Creep comes from “over perfect” engineering: continuously
trying to improve an acceptable design to make it better. Systems engineers must follow the
mantra of “better is the enemy of good enough.” The greatest contributor to requirements creep,
however, is often the user. If personnel from the user community have constant access to the
contractor, design changes will be continuous and never ending. The C-5 SPO team managed
the inputs of non-SPO people by controlling all changes via the SPO’s Configuration Control
Board (CCB). Lockheed’s process for controlling changes also used a CCB, but their first line of
defense was the Chief Engineer design meetings.
C-5 Requirements Process Summary
The systems engineering process used to develop a balanced set of requirements during
concept exploration was a model for the application of operational mission analysis. The
organization responsible for developing the requirements took the lead and fully involved all the
organizations that could affect decisions. All organizations that would be affected by the
decisions were contributors. The requirements for the system were well balanced and the design
and production were accurately judged to be feasible with the state-of-the-art technologies.
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3.2

C-5 Learning Principle 2: Total Package Procurement Concept (TPPC)

The contract type for the C-5A was specified to be the new Total Package Procurement
Concept (TPPC) championed by the Air Force and DoD. The TPPC contract was a firm fixed
price incentive fee contract for the development of the system and a first production quantity of
58 aircraft (Run A). The contract also included an option for a second quantity purchase of 57
aircraft (Run B). Because of its impact on program cost, the relationship between the basic
contract for Run A and the option for Run B is important to follow throughout this case study.
The price for Run B aircraft was based on the price paid for Run A aircraft, but a cost
acceleration clause allowed the contractor to recoup losses as the number of aircraft in Run B
increased. There was also an option for a third production lot of 100 aircraft, called Run C, but it
was never exercised because funding did not suffice to purchase all of the Run B aircraft.
TPPC was announced to the contractors and the Source Selection Team on 25 February
1965 as the acquisition process for the C-5A program. Aligning the contract and assessing the
impact would delay the Source Selection by one month [6]. This was the first application of
TPPC anywhere in the DoD.
TPPC was the acquisition reform of its day. Because it played a dominant role in the
success and the failures of the C-5A program, its genesis is noteworthy 3 .
TPPC was a new concept for weapons system procurement devised by the Honorable
Robert H. Charles, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations and Logistics. The
purposes were to enhance the competitive environment and to create incentives for cost-efficient
programs that would reward contractors for controlling development and production costs.
Secretary Charles had previously worked for McDonnell Aircraft Corp. and had a “...first hand
view of the problems created by the lack of competition that existed under the contractual
arrangements employed on weapons acquisition programs” [6, p. 13]. During the 1950s,
contractors commonly submitted bids with an optimistically low price for development, but the
average cost overrun by the time development and production were complete was 320 percent
[6]. During the early 1960s many initiatives were discussed for increasing competition and
controlling costs. Almost all the changes had an objective of better defining the total system
cost, not just the development cost. The introduction of life-cycle cost – a vital prerequisite for
any TPPC – was one of the lasting outcomes of this reform era.
Secretary Charles introduced his new TPPC at a management conference at WrightPatterson Air Force Base on 25 June 1964 ([6, p. 21]). On November 21, 1964, Secretary of Air
Force Eugene M. Zuckert proposed application of the TPPC to the CX-HLS, noting:
I believe it is feasible to use this “life cycle” concept on this
program. The CX-HLS is a subsonic transport. With respect to the
airframe, there is no large advance in the current state-of-the-art, and the
technological building blocks are in hand. The Air Force is able to specify
the desired performance with precision and with reasonable expectation
that this performance can be achieved. The program has already gone
through exhaustive parametric studies (concept formulation), and will
3

An excellent description of the rationale for the TPPC can be found in [6, pages 13-26], a thesis written
by two AFIT students in 1970.
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have gone through project (contract) definition before development
begins. There is adequate competition among both the airframe and the
engine manufactures. [6]
Secretary of Defense McNamara officially approved the TPPC for the C-5A program on
25 February 1965. The impact of this decision has been discussed at length throughout the
literature. Of all the comments by the numerous protagonists and antagonists, one of the most
profound was made by Poncar and Johnson:
A concept had now been developed to design, competitively
procure, and scientifically manage a major weapons system from the
outset through its operational life. It would also give assurance that
performance requirements were tied to definitive cost commitments. To
the uninitiated, the simple statements did not appear to have profound
implications. In fact, the impact of such statements was not readily
understood unless one fully appreciated the sophistication inherent in the
complex weapons systems acquisition process. The advent of this new
procurement technique forced complementary changes in planning,
scientific management, budget, and systems engineering techniques which
had a long-standing past. [6, p. 26]
Acquisition reform is ongoing. Decision makers must fully understand the programmatic
impact of each reform, or the subtle features of well-intentioned reforms may well undo the very
improvements they seek to make. The systems engineering process must include a thorough
assessment of the impact of reforms. Commensurate with this obligation is the responsibility to
make decision makers aware of potential pitfalls and risks.
Development Phase
The TPPC failed because it neither achieved the fundamental objective of developing an
accurate cost estimate for the program nor controlled cost growth. It was, however, the first step
in formulating the contract approach to address the system and life cycle costs. It also stipulated
that the prime contractor have Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR).
Cost Overrun
The C-5A program was plagued by cost overruns from the very beginning. The cost
overrun was not unexpected by either the Air Force or the contractor [6, 8, 12]. The Air Force
had predicted a most probable cost of $1.86 billion as opposed to the contractor’s best and final
estimate of $1.71 billion on 4 September 1965. The actual cost of the original contract grew by
another $64 million by December 1965 [6]. No one estimated costs as high as the eventual
program overrun to $3.5 billion for the development effort plus the 115 aircraft in Run A and
Run B.
The enormous cost overrun had multiple causes. Key reasons included: (1) the original
cost estimate was aggressively low, influenced by the contractor’s expectation of an ancillary
benefit in the form of follow-on for commercial air vehicle design; (2) the perceived low cost
estimates of the competitors; (3) the redesign of the proposal baseline as the contract baseline in
four days without an accurate assessment of the impact to the cost; and (4) the aggressively low
contract weight empty guarantee, coupled with an underestimate of the effort the
design/production teams would expend to achieve the value.
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Volumes have been written about the C-5’s cost growth; it caused the most controversy
and angst over the system. It plays an important role in this case study because it resulted in
termination before all the aircraft in Runs A and B were procured. Cost was a pivotal factor in
the program because it was hopelessly understated – to the extent that the contractor had no
chance of meeting the cost submitted in the proposal from the very start. The important lessons
lie in what happened to the program because of the low cost estimate and the consideration of
what might have occurred if the value had been attainable. Another equally important lesson
derives from the significant amount of additional resources the government had to allocate to
correct the problems.
The TPPC fixed price contract for development and the initial production run of 58
aircraft proved a fatally flawed strategy. Underbidding by all three competitors was known and
acknowledged, but Air Force and DoD decision makers signed the contract anyway [10]. The
prevailing attitude by the government during the first five years of the contract was, “Let’s hold
their feet to the fire; they signed the contract.” There is no question that Lockheed’s cost overrun
was due in part to the intensive effort to design and manufacture parts and assemblies to the
lowest possible weight [5 (Ormsby)], but this was not the dominant factor in the overrun [6]. In
fact, the cost overrun of the C-5A program resulted from six primary factors:
•
•
•
•
•

•

3.3

The TPPC failed to meet its objectives.
Both the original proposal and the proposal as modified on 4 September 1965
contained an aggressively low cost proposal for the tasks.
The aircraft redesign, accomplished in a mere four days, was inadequately
reviewed and resulted in higher than expected technical risk.
The guaranteed weight empty stipulation, with its attendant cost penalty in the
contract, drove Lockheed over the engineering budget.
The performance requirements for range and payload required an inordinate
amount of testing, analysis, and refinement of the drag, the flap/slat design, and
the flap/slat settings.
The environment of the 1960s and the technological unknowns that existed during
the design and development phase would have caused a program overrun no
matter which contractor built the aircraft [6, p. 60]. High inflation, the demands
of Vietnam, and technical difficulties previously neither experienced nor
envisioned but related simply to the size of the aircraft led to unplanned additional
effort.

C-5 Learning Principle 3: Guaranteed Weight

Interviews 4 with key personnel confirm that one element characterizes the systems
engineering process during the C-5A design: the allocation of aircraft weight empty throughout
the subsystems and structure of the aircraft. The allocation of aircraft weight empty to all the
subsystem design teams played a crucial part of the overall program, first, because weight is
always a vital technical design parameter for airplanes, and second, because the value was
guaranteed in the C-5A contract. The contract included a large cost penalty to the contractor if
any delivered aircraft exceeded the value.
4

The people interviewed are listed in Appendix 2, Interviews.
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Proposal Phase
The importance of early decisions in the life of a program cannot be over emphasized.
The need for the systems engineering process to thoroughly consider potential consequences of
seemingly simple decisions and to assess alternatives is never more important than during the
source selection process and the time period leading up the contract approval.
Several events occurred during the proposal phase that would forever influence the
outcome of the C-5A program. The systems engineering process did not adequately assess the
potential impacts of programmatic decisions, yet those decisions affected the design, production,
and operation of the system. The systems engineers recognized that technical trade offs were
vital to the program. Equally important were decisions about technical design alternatives made
between go-ahead and the preliminary design review. These were recognized to have long-term
ramifications on the system and received the attention in trade studies required to fully assess the
consequences of the choices. By the time the program reached Critical Design Review (CDR)
the design was essentially finished and the remaining effort was expended in building the parts
and assembly and checkout. Changes after CDR were difficult, expensive, and had a negative
cost impact, but were made in the constant effort to reduce weight.
The Air Force decision to advise the C-5A bidders that claims made in the proposal by
the offering contractor would be included in the final specification had far-reaching impacts on
the design. Lockheed believed that Boeing had underestimated the weight empty of their
proposed air vehicle and therefore felt compelled to propose an ambitious, but reasonable,
estimate for the vehicle weight empty of 302,494 pounds [6]. By the proposal’s own admission,
the actual weight empty estimate was a larger 318,415 pounds for the baseline, which included a
5% growth factor. However, the contractor claimed the actual value of 302,494 could be
achieved by realizing advances in technology, materials, and production techniques. The Air
Force decided to place the lower weight empty value in the specification as a firm requirement
and included a penalty clause in the contract that made the contractor liable for a penalty of
$10,000 per pound of weight empty over and above the stipulated value for each aircraft. The
contractor accepted the value in the contract! Compounding the impact of the decision to propose
an aggressive weight empty, the contractor also proposed aggressive values for range and
payload, which the Air Force also converted into firm specification requirements. For the design
engineering process these decisions had the consequence of removing most, if not all, of the
technical management reserve that the design team could use to make trade offs between
subsystems, design approaches, and operational requirements.
A second major influencing event occurred following the source selection. The
competing contractors were briefed on the Air Force’s evaluation of their proposals in late
August 1965. The purpose of briefing each contractor separately was to prepare for a final
negotiation on specification requirements and for the contractor’s best and final offer on cost.
The Air Force evaluation team advised Lockheed that their airport performance, specifically
takeoff distance, was inadequate to meet the Air Force operational requirements. The evaluation
team calculated that the Lockheed wing was too small and that the leading edge and trailing edge
flaps would provide less lift than estimated in the proposal. To stay competitive, Lockheed
redesigned their aircraft in four days, in effect negating much of the careful balancing of the
design represented in the original April 1965 proposal. The new configuration increased the
leading-edge flaps to full span, changed the design of the trailing-edge flaps, and increased the
wing area from 5,600 square feet 6,200 square feet. In the same four days, the carefully
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balanced and well-integrated cost, schedule, and performance baseline of the original proposal
was recalculated and resubmitted. Lockheed agreed to change their design, increased the
specified weight empty in the new proposal from 302,494 pounds to 318,469 pounds, and raised
their target cost estimate from $1.65 billion to $1.71 billion. Because of the short time available
to assess the impact of the changes, however, these changes fell short of what was eventually
required.
The third complicating factor during the proposal phase was Lockheed’s decision to
allocate the smallest possible cost for the development and production costs. This corporate
decision was influenced by the benefit that the company could realize from future contracts for a
large civilian transport aircraft. All three of the competing contractors were planning on such a
synergy, so that much of the C-5 effort would underpin a commercial venture for a modern large
airliner. In fact, technology based on the C-5 gave birth to the Douglas DC-10, the Boeing 747,
and the Lockheed L-1011. However, Lockheed never received the total benefit of winning the
C-5A competition [5]. Their proposed price was far lower than would be required to
successfully complete development and production of the C-5A aircraft, and Lockheed did not
realize a direct and substantial benefit to the L-1011.
Effect of Guaranteed Weight Empty
The inability of the design to meet the required fatigue life can be traced exclusively to
the Air Force’s insistence that the contractor meet the required guaranteed weight empty. As
noted, the Air Force would not accept delivery of any overweight airplanes without a punitive
cost penalty to the contractor. However, Lockheed contributed to the problem because of the
low estimate for weight empty and the insufficient growth margin. The Air Force included the
guaranteed weight empty in the specification because of the belief that lower weight empty
means lower costs, and because of the difficulties the DoD had experienced in defending the F111 program. 5 Finally, the Pentagon held to the righteous view that the government should hold
Lockheed responsible because they had signed a contract and should hold them to their
commitment [5 (Ormsby, Smithers, Wood)].
The weight empty was problematic from the very start of the contract and was
exacerbated by the drag. Wind tunnel testing in October 1965 showed far more drag than the
contractor had predicted during the concept exploration assessments. Drag was too high by 41
counts. (A count of drag is aerodynamic jargon for 0.001 of drag coefficient. 6 ) During the next
months, Lockheed redesigned the fuselage fairings, the pylon fairing, and the landing gear pods
and finally reduced the drag to 0.0256 by their estimate, but the added fairings added 3300
pounds of weight [6, 9]. The normal growth of weight from go-ahead to first flight also started
to show itself. Historically, weight grows by 6% to 10%, depending on the degree to which the
technology state of the art is challenged, as the design evolves to CDR and again during
production as necessary and desired changes surface.

5

While a lighter aircraft will in general be less expensive on a dollars-per-pound basis, it is not so for a
fixed set of requirements. For a given set of requirements, a lighter aircraft will be more expensive because of the
added effort to over-constrain a technical parameter that would naturally seek its balance in the whole set of system
requirements.
6

The government team’s evaluation of the drag during the source selection predicted a drag coefficient of
0.0265 or 265 counts versus the contractor’s claimed 250 counts.
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The SPO was well aware of the unrealistically low weight value in the specification, the
small likelihood of meeting it, and the impact it exerted on cost and fatigue life. To determine
how the contractor was addressing the problem and how it could be brought under control, the
SPO sent Lockheed’s program manager a letter on 5 January 1967, asking for a position from the
company on performance. The contractor did not respond to the letter [6]. A second letter was
sent on 13 January, and again was never answered. On 23 January 1967, the program manager
met with the SPO at WPAFB and asked that Lockheed be allowed to change the engine thrust
rating at sea level from a hot day to a tropical day. He also promised that Lockheed would
manage GE to a higher thrust engine – from 41,000 pounds to 50,000 pounds thrust – at a cost
increase to the government of only $5.12 million and would meet all performance requirements, ,
and asked that the SPO to remove the weight empty from the specification [6]. Because the Air
Force could see no benefits accruing to the government from the changes, the SPO denied the
request. The senior Air Force leadership in the Pentagon concurred with the SPO.
On 1 February, the SPO sent a cure notice to the contractor, tantamount to a definitive
statement that the government was on the verge of canceling the contract. Lockheed never
brought the weight up again, immediately removed 6,000 pounds from the wing (see Figure 3-4)
and responded to the cure notice by assuring the government that they would meet all
performance requirements of the specification. In short, the net result of the contractor’s
implementing their responsibility under the TSPR clause of the contract and highlighting a major
design risk to the SPO was to incur a cure notice.
Effect of Guaranteed Weight Empty on the Design
The story of the weight empty on the C-5A provides a wealth of insight into the aircraft
design process and the application of the system engineering process. The specification included
very demanding aircraft performance requirements as well as a demanding weight empty, and
the Air Force insisted on near-perfect efficiency in the design and performance of the aircraft,
leaving little room for trade off between requirements and weight as the design matured. The
Air Force’s reluctance to trade off any of the demanding requirements set the stage for the C-5
weight problems that were to follow.
As previously described, during source selection the Air Force notified all competitors
about various proposal deficiencies that needed to be corrected and resubmitted and gave them
only four days to review, refine, correct, and resubmit the proposals. Despite the many months
of work developing initial design proposals that accurately described aircraft performance and
specifications, each competitor was forced to make serious changes in a matter of days. The
Boeing aircraft required few changes, the Douglas aircraft was judged deficient, and Lockheed,
the ultimate winner, made considerable changes to the wing, leading-edge flaps, engine thrust
reversers, and inlets. It was impossible to replicate all the analysis, testing, and data that had
gone into the original proposal in four days. This rush to contract contributed to a contractual
guaranteed weight empty that was unattainable.
Problems in meeting the guaranteed weight empty requirement ultimately resulted from
the approach Lockheed used to produce its weight estimates for the initial design proposal, the
revised proposal guaranteed weight empty, and the expected weight growth. Lockheed
management applied a 5% reduction factor to the originally developed weight empty to arrive at
the original proposal value of 302,495 pounds. This factor was extrapolated from smaller
aircraft and assumed technological advances that would lead to future weight savings. To
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account for the unknown weights of the redesign that occurred in the first four days of September
1965, Lockheed adjusted the new guaranteed weight empty to a value of 318,469 pounds. This
figure was based on an estimate for the new wing area structure and flap/slat changes. Had the
proposed new weight value been based on the engineering estimate without the 5% reduction,
the contractor would have retained some design flexibility. After the months of analysis that had
gone into achieving the weight estimate for the original design, Lockheed took a daring risk to
include the weight of the redesign in the 318,469 pound estimate, a decision that would plague
the development of the C-5 for the remainder of the design program.
The expected weight growth used in determining the target weight of the aircraft was
allocated on the basis of experience with the C-141. However, these allocations were
fundamentally flawed because they were based on skewed guaranteed weight empty. Table 3-2
shows the computations of the target weight while Figure 3-3 shows the track from contract
award to first flight. 7
Table 3-2. C-5A Post Design Weight Analysis Report, Vol. II [11]

The goal of the target weight calculation was for the “air vehicle to be initially designed
to a weight level sufficiently low to permit reasonable weight growth without exceeding
guaranteed weight at the time of delivery” [11]. Weight growth allowances of 4% of the
controllable weight, 1.5% for manufacturing variations prior to first flight, and .5% for basic
vehicle weight growth account for an initial target weight that is approximately 5% below
operation weight (OW). In guaranteed weight empty terms, this initial target weight was over
2000 pounds less than that listed in the original proposal. If the aircraft had not been redesigned,

7

Note that Figure 3-3 and Table 3-2 list operating weight instead of guaranteed weight empty. The
operating weight for these tables is equal to guaranteed weight empty plus 5435 pounds of operating equipment.
This same difference will reappear in Figures 3-4 and 3-5.
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this methodology would have been a logical way to meet the goal. However, the redesigned
wing, coupled with the aggressive weight goals, made meeting the guaranteed weight empty goal
almost impossible.

Figure 3-3. Lockheed’s Projected Weight Track vs. Phase [11]
In mid 1966, when the impacts of the redesign were better understood, the SPO
recognized and alerted Lockheed to the problems. Lockheed’s requests that the SPO increase the
guaranteed weight empty requirement by 14,000 pounds were denied, as were requests to pursue
other possible solutions in meeting requirements such as increasing engine thrust. When it
became clear that the Air Force had no intention of making any design tradeoffs pertaining to
weight and performance, Lockheed began an extensive and ambitious program of monitoring,
controlling, and reducing aircraft weight.
Lockheed’s weight reduction program consisted of three distinct phases, each spanning a
specific time in the design and development process. The first phase, already in progress when
the contract was awarded, was to terminate at the completion of the preliminary design. The
second phase continued from that point to the first flight, and the third phase was to end when
the first full specification C-5 was delivered. Originally structured to concentrate efforts on
monitoring and controlling weight growth, it evolved into a plan dedicated primarily to reduce
weight and cost.
During phase I, the target weight allocations were broken down and distributed to the
many functional design groups. This breakdown included specific job packages so that each
team could clearly see the goals. Lockheed developed procedures to use the target weights and
allocations as a control over the release of job packages for the design: no jobs were to be
released that were over the target weight. The efforts to reduce weight became more challenging
when further detailed analysis dictated configuration changes that drove revisions to the weight
allocations. Design groups found themselves having to do more with less allowance for weight.
Red and Gold flag meetings consistently monitored the progress of the efforts [11].
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One approach to allocating weight among different areas was the creation of two reserve
weight funds. If a job was completed under weight, half of that weight was put into each fund.
One fund was used as a source of allocation for future weight growth, and the other was for jobs
not likely to be completed under target weight. Despite their utility, both reserve funds were
cancelled and transformed into a Target Weight reserve fund that served to accomplish the same
goal.
In addition to the weight meetings that occurred on all levels during the development,
Lockheed had programs to encourage innovative weight reduction ideas among employees. The
first program lacked incentives, but still managed to gather over 1700 ideas, of which 64 were
incorporated for a weight savings of approximately 4000 pounds. This program was replaced at
50% design release with a program that gave $200 per pound to employees with weight savings
ideas that were eventually incorporated into the aircraft [11]. Though records for the payout and
weight saved were not well maintained, Lockheed stated this program was worthwhile.
Other mechanisms to restrict and reduce weight during phase I included controlling the
nominal thickness of aluminum sheet metal, chemical milling of parts to remove excess material,
and monitoring the thickness of paint at application. Lockheed also developed programs for
contract vendors to meet weight target allocations or face penalties for overweight deliveries.
These and the many other aggressive weight reduction programs still fell short of enabling
Lockheed to meet its target at 50% release.
Phase II was implemented during production at a time when it became clear that extreme
measures had to be taken to meet guaranteed weight empty. It was equally aggressive, and
included some of the same efforts seen in the previous phase. A Red Flag/Gold Flag report led
to the “Save Cost and Limit Pounds” program , called SCALP. SCALP combined the weight
and cost relationship to evaluate parts considered for weight reduction. It devised three clear
guidelines. Changes of five pounds or less had to cost less than $40 per pound to implement, and
changes of more than five pounds less than $75. The last guideline gave special priority to
changes that saved cost and weight. High cost and weight areas of the aircraft were reviewed
using these principles to further the weight reduction efforts in an affordable manner. Because
this program was initiated at the completion of the stress analysis, it was applied to many overstrengthened areas for a large weight savings.
The final phase of the weight reduction efforts carried over many of the same programs
over from both phases I and II. They included monthly Red & Gold reports and meetings to
monitor weight and cost and the continuation of the SCALP program on a limited scale.
Because phase III occurred during flight test, any changes with large manufacturing impacts
were not considered programmatically feasible.
The weight reduction efforts were so concentrated on conserving cost that they
compromised the ability to meet other requirements. The negative consequences of the weight
reduction efforts for the “over strengthened” areas became very apparent after the 1969 static test
failure of the wing at 125% of the design limit load. A wing that had been thoroughly and
meticulously designed for the original proposal had borne a large burden of the weight reduction
efforts on a heavier aircraft. From the estimated weight report, in the time frame starting with
the 60% design release point and proceeding to the actual weight of the ninth aircraft, the overall
weight of the wing was reduced by almost 4000 pounds, or about 4.5%. At one point in the
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wing’s development, it had reached a low weight of 78,100 pounds, 8% below the weight at
proposal. The progression of the wing weight can be seen in Figure 3-4.

Figure 3-4. Actual Weight Data for C-5A Through the Ninth Delivered Aircraft [11]
The overall aircraft saw a low guaranteed weight empty of 310,000 pounds in July of
1966 before the impacts of the redesign were fully understood. The guaranteed weight empty
then immediately increased to almost 323,000 pounds before Lockheed again tried to reduce
system weight. All of the working group weight trends can be found in Reference 11; the data
shows that the wing, tail, and control surface groups all demonstrated very significant decreases
in weight, while the weight of the aircraft, specifically the body, showed considerable increases.
The summary data for aircraft total weight is shown in Figure 3-5.
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Figure 3-5. Actual Total Aircraft Weight Data Through the Ninth Aircraft [11]
During the period that followed the second static test failure in March 1971, it was
determined that payload and maneuvers used throughout the operational fleet of C-5 aircraft built
under the original contract had to be limited. Additionally, the widespread fatigue cracks
appearing in the fatigue test articles and in the test aircraft forced the SPO to issue restrictions for
maneuvers, payload, operations in turbulence, and ground-air-ground cycles. The new limits on
operational usage yielded a service life prediction of 8,000 hours, far short of the required 30,000
hours of life at a more severe usage spectrum.
Lockheed’s new wing design of the late 1970s would remedy this problem via retrofit.
The completed wing redesign brought the service life of the C-5A up to the design specifications
and the aircraft weight to a guaranteed weight empty of 332,500 pounds. Ironically enough, this
weight value is just less than 5%, or about 14,000 pounds, over the original guaranteed weight
empty of 318,469 given in the second proposal. Had Lockheed been more conservative in
estimating the revised guaranteed weight empty and provided a more typical growth factor to the
revised guaranteed weight empty for the contract, in all likelihood the weight empty and the
fatigue requirements would have been satisfied. On the other hand, the Air Force’s
unwillingness to accept tradeoffs or any deviations from the contract contributed to the short
service life.
The weight issues in the C-5 program underscore the importance and the implications of
decisions that at the time seem to have small consequences. In this case, the problems were
further compounded by the lack of customer flexibility during program development. The C-5A
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program took weight monitoring, weight control, and weight reduction efforts to the extreme and
did a good job of creating the framework of how the process should work.
New Weight Allocations
After the SPO rejected Lockheed’s request for weight relief and issued the cure notice,
the design groups received new (lower) weight allocations. The result was far-reaching. The
weight allocation for the wing group design team was reduced from 85,750 pounds in January
1967 to 82,000 pounds in June 1967 as shown in Figure 3-4. The wing design team used a
design stress level 40 percent higher than industry-accepted practices for transport aircraft and 40
percent higher than those used in the design of the C-141 wing. 8 Friction-fit, taper-lock titanium
fasteners were used extensively in the wing. So precious was every ounce that the
manufacturing process stipulated a 32-step chemical milling process for the wing skins.
Lockheed implemented numerous innovative initiatives during the late design and early
manufacturing timeframe, some of which were untested on previous applications. Because of
the schedule requirement to fly in April 1968 and an $11 million penalty for late deliveries, there
was little time for risk reduction assessments and tests in the laboratory. Consequently, many of
the new changes were implemented for the first time on the production vehicles.
Aircraft Weight Empty and Its Effect on Cost
The impetus to place a guaranteed aircraft weight empty requirement in the specification
of the C-5A contract came not only from the controversy over weight increase in the F-111
program, but also from the classic relationship between cost and aircraft weight empty. All three
of the important cost values – development cost, production cost, and life-cycle cost – increase
with aircraft weight empty. Most of the cost models that existed in the 1960s and 1970s heavily
favored weight empty as a dominant parameter in estimating a project’s most probable cost. The
trend line clearly showed that a lighter aircraft would be less costly.
The subtle danger of using this obvious trend without fully understanding the
implications of the behavior of weight at each specific point can lead to a faulty conclusion. The
behavior of cost and weight does not follow the trend line once the aircraft is selected to meet a
specific set of requirements. Weight empty may vary among the different aircraft design
approaches companies propose to satisfy the set of requirements (wing sweep, number of
engines, “T” tail, materials, etc.), but the variation is generally small and is part of the scatter
around a curve drawn through the cost-versus-weight data points.
The C-5A serves as a good example to explain the behavior of weight and cost about a
specific point. For any given set of requirements, such as those derived for the C-5A, and for the
selected aircraft design approach of Lockheed, there is a weight empty that would result from the
systems engineering process. As the systems engineering process balances the aircraft features
or engineering parameters, such as drag, thrust, and cost (development, production, and lifecycle), to satisfy the specified performance requirements for range, payload, cruise altitude,
cruise Mach number, takeoff distance, and landing distance, it derives the feature or parameter of
weight. The resultant weight empty would be the weight that should naturally evolve. Thus, the

8

The wing design was conducted in England because of the shortage of engineers available to Lockheed in
the United States. They performed admirably and were an outstanding team, led by Lockheed engineering manager
Ed Gustafson [1].
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solid linear trend line in Figure 3-6 is actually made up of many different aircraft empty weights,
each derived from systems engineering processes to satisfy that particular aircraft set of
requirements. 9 Clearly, if the any of the requirements in the selected set change, the cost and
weight would vary along the trend line.

Wmin

We

Wmax

Figure 3-6. Cost Behavior as Weight Changes
Examine what would happen if a feature of the design, such as the empty weight, is
arbitrarily elevated to the level of a requirement at the same priority as a true requirement, such
as payload or range. Consider a fixed set of performance requirements, n, which exists in a fixed
space, K. A variable set of features or parameters for each design approach exists to satisfy the
set of requirements, n. One of these features is the weight empty, We, that would normally
evolve from the balanced application of the systems engineering process for the specific
configuration. The solid line in Figure 3-7 represents all the Wes that resulted from aircraft
designs that met their sets of requirements, n1, n2, n3,........nn, in K. This trend is real, because it
is plotted from actual data, and, if used as plotted, it is an accurate indicator of the relationship
between weight and cost. However, if the set of requirements is fixed and one of the parameters
of the design is artificially managed, the trend line is no longer applicable because that is not
how the solid line was derived. Now the relationship has to be reassessed.
In fact, the relationship between weight and cost is nonlinear when the set of
requirements is fixed and weight is artificially changed. Postulate what happens if some external
force, Dp (representing a change of pressure on weight), is increased at that We. For the specific
9

New materials and manufacturing techniques will change We, a consideration Lockheed used when the
proposed empty weight was 5% less than the value derived from the parametric estimate.
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aircraft, the weight will go down, moving to the left. But to save weight, extraordinary design
and production techniques will be required and these are more expensive than the design and
production approach the systems engineering process would have developed for the initial We.
So as the weight empty decreases, the cost increases! As Dp increases further it becomes more
and more difficult to reduce the weight, until finally the cost increases asymptotically to the
minimum possible weight, Wmin. There is also an extreme negative impact on the schedule,
because work will expand and be more difficult to accomplish. Eventually, one of the
requirements in the set, n, will be breached, as depicted as the curved line in Figure 3-6. In the
case of the C-5A, static strength and fatigue life were no longer attainable.
Note what happens to the cost as the design moves away from We if the pressure on
weight decreases. Initially, as weight increases, the cost decreases. However, this only occurs
when the increase is small, because the cost of raw materials will eventually drive cost up with
increasing weight. When weight increases, it is only a matter of pounds before one of the
requirements in the set, n, is breached. Thus, allowing weight to be unconstrained may seem
attractive at first, but it will result in exactly the opposite results than those desired.
The actual controlling factors on weight empty are the set of requirements, n. As weight
decreases, eventually system requirements will be breached. In the case of the C-5A, the static
strength and the service life requirements were violated. Had the weight been allowed to grow,
one of the performance requirements (range, take off distance, etc.) would have been breached.
This was exactly the SPO’s concern and was a factor in not yielding the weight allowance sought
by Lockheed in January 1967.
Systems Engineering Actions During Weight Growth
The systems engineering process effectively allocated the guaranteed weight empty to the
design groups and developed processes by which design teams and production teams were
rewarded for saving weight. The problem that faced the process, the design team, and the
production floor was that the weight allocation was inadequate and inconsistent with the budget
allocation.
The structural designers adopted a rational strategy in face of limited weight relief:
design the structure for ultra light weight, design close to the margins (and they all knew the
design was close to the margins), and enter the test phase knowing that strength and fatigue “hot
spots” were inevitable [5 (Ormsby, Smithers, et al.)]. The approach was based on the premise
that the number of hot spots found during testing would be limited to a few areas that could be
relatively easily repaired through retrofit. In fact, this strategy worked well for the fuselage,
landing gear, vertical and horizontal tails, wing leading-edge slats and supporting structure, and
wing trailing-edge surfaces and supporting structure. The pylon and the basic wing structure,
however, experienced extensive fatigue cracking and were replaced in their entirety.
The decision to place the guaranteed weight empty in the contract constituted one of the
glaring weaknesses of the program. As Lockheed attempted to meet the aggressively understated
weight guarantee stipulated in the contract, the situation compounded negatively at every turn.
Lockheed’s systems engineering process only predicted that the weight could very well be
exceeded and there would be a commensurate impact on program cost, payload, and airport
performance. At no time did the process attempt a quantitative projection or even consider a
range of potential outcomes. Thus, it only addressed qualitative concerns, thereby leaving the
decision process in the hands of others.
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3.4

C-5 Learning Principle 4: Independent Review Team

The systems engineering process employed by the Air Force SPO and the systems
engineering process employed by Lockheed were vastly different. The SPO managed the
requirements and the contractor managed the design to meet the requirements. If the design
could not meet the requirements, cost and schedule risk increased exponentially as the disparity
between the expected and estimated performance increased. The SPO’s responsibility was to be
technically astute enough to understand the implications for the design levied by the
requirements as a whole (operational effectiveness) and by each requirement (risk). Lockheed’s
systems engineering process, used in conjunction with the design process, highlighted the design
risk and the consequences that achieving the specification performance had for technical, cost,
and schedule risks. When the conflict between the requirements and the design surfaced, the
SPO assessment and systems engineering process should have been able to evaluate the
reduction in performance relative to the overall mission and the ability to complete the
fundamental job at hand, i.e., move an Army division’s equipment to the war zone.
Cure Notice and the First Two IRTs
During the latter half of 1966 and into January 1967, Lockheed actively expressed to the
SPO the advantages to the program if the SPO would remove the guaranteed weight empty from
the contract. The contractor also requested authorization to manage and fund GE by an
additional $5.12 million to increase the thrust to 50,000 pounds from the GE–Air Force contract
value of 41,000 pounds 10 [5 (Swisher, Ormsby, Posson); 6, p. 99]. Following the SPO’s refusal
on 23 January 1967 and the confirmation by the senior Air Force leadership in the Pentagon, the
SPO issued Lockheed a cure notice on 1 February 1967.
The impact on Lockheed’s engineering process has already been described. As an
additional response to the cure notice, Lockheed chartered an internal review team (IRT) to
assess the design for the company and the SPO. Headquarters Air Force also requested an
independent assessment and Maj. Gen. James T. Stewart, ASD/CC, tasked the Defense Advisory
Group (DAG) to form an IRT, which conducted the review during March and April 1967, and
concluded:
•

That the contactor is doing a competent, responsible, and in many areas, an
imaginative job;

•

That all the specified performance except landing distance appears to be within reach,
as judged from the drawing release point which is estimated as corresponding to the
75 percent of the final empty weight. The landing distance, however, is likely to be
exceeded by about 250 feet;

•

That the empty weight as a guaranteed item is likely to be over specifications by
about 4,000 pounds;

•

That continued vigorous efforts in all areas is required; all the performance must fall
on the optimistic edge of the calculation accuracy range, before the guarantees can be

10

General Electric agreed with the Lockheed proposal and was present at the meeting. They felt the need to
stay in competition with Pratt and Whitney for the Boeing 747 development. The weight was increasing on the 747,
so Boeing had asked P&W to increase thrust to maintain system performance:
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met, and improvements in one area are likely to be required to compensate for falling
somewhat short in one of the others [6].
After the two IRT assessments, Lockheed’s reconfirmation of the commitment to meet all
requirements, and the new weight allocations to the designers, the program proceeded toward
full-scale structural ground testing and the flight test program.
Validation and Verification: Development, Flight, and Operational Test
The development test process required extensive laboratory testing to prove the design,
using buildup tests from component to subassembly to subsystem. Both static and fatigue tests
were required for the full-scale aircraft structure. The full-scale static test article for the structure
is shown in Figure 3-7 [12]. The landing gear static test article was a separate assembly.

Figure 3-7. Static Test Article [12]
The systems engineering process also developed a suite of test articles required to prove
compliance with the 30,000-hour service life requirement. These test articles are shown in
Figure 3-8, and include the test article nomenclature used by the program [12]. The test fixture
X993, noted as Expedited Wing, was built because the Scientific Advisory Board panel
recommended it to the SPO in June 1971. The device was added to the program in an attempt to
obtain early fatigue test life data.
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Figure 3-8. Fatigue Test Articles [12]
Both the government and the contractor were heavily involved in planning and testing
these articles. The contractor was responsible for developing the test plans; the Air Force was
responsible for approving the plans and the final report [5 (Smithers)]. The joint teams working
on the test articles cooperated in developing the test conditions and assessing the final results.
This cooperation worked well when the objectives were mutually inclusive. However, when the
appearance of fatigue problems accelerated in 1969, the Air Force investigated the possibility of
accelerating the test articles and inserting another test article in the test program, but Lockheed
could not find a way to comply because of schedule conflicts. When the widespread cracking in
the wing fatigue article was obvious, almost all the aircraft or the parts were complete. So, while
the systems engineering process developed the rationale for the test articles, the results did not
become available in time to influence production. 11
Static and Fatigue Tests
Throughout the remainder of 1967 and into 1968, both Lockheed and the SPO
engineering teams became increasingly concerned about the wing static strength and the fatigue
life. By mid-1969, serious problems were apparent. The full-scale static test article, X999 (see
Figure 3-8), failed structurally at 123 percent of the design ultimate load. The failure occurred at
the wing fuselage junction at the center wing box carry-through structure to the fuselage. The
fault was traced to the structural model, which showed a continuous load path through the spar
caps. In fact, the caps carried little load and the load path became discontinuous [5, Smithers].
The parts were redesigned, but failed at 126%. Flight and operational aircraft were placed under
flight limits to restrict high load factor maneuvers.
In 1969, flight test air vehicle No. 3 had already exhibited fatigue cracks in the rear beam
cap of the wing. In October 1970, the full-scale fatigue article, X998, had developed initial
cracking after a mere 9,000 hours of the required 120,000 hours of the 15 simulated Mission
11

The contract was awarded in September 1965, the first flight occurred in June 1968, and the last of the 81
aircraft was delivered in May 1973, underscoring a high degree of concurrency.
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Profiles required by the fatigue test plan. In December 1970, the second wing of fatigue test
article X993 entered testing. By September 1971, the first fatigue test article had accumulated
15,000 hours and the second had accumulated 33,000 hours. Testing was terminated because
both test articles had extensive general cracking. Figure 3-8 shows the configuration of the fullscale structural fatigue article for the wing and fuselage of the C-5 aircraft. The wing is
composed of three major wing boxes: center, inner, and outer. All three wing boxes showed
general cracking, almost all of it originating from holes fitted with the friction fit titanium
fasteners.
In December 1971, a C-5 IRT [13] was formed to review the situation and develop
alternatives. 12 The team assessed the C-5A structure to determine the necessary operational
restrictions to ensure safety of flight. The payload and maneuvers were limited, including the
elimination of terrain following, heavy payload during peacetime, aerial delivery of cargo, and
operations out of austere unimproved runways. The team also assessed the structural fatigue life
of the wing under several sets of Mission Profiles, and developed options A through K to bring
the wing up to the full service life capability. These options, which formed the decision basis for
the eventual redesign and production of a new wing for the operational fleet, are shown in
Table 3-3.
Table 3-3. C-5 Independent Review Team Options A Through K [13]

The new wing design was incorporated on all 81 C-5As and all 50 C-5Bs. It had
basically the same three-box design and construction as the original wing, but with added
thickness to provide strength and lower stress. The flaps, ailerons, and secondary structure of the
12

A complete description of all the fatigue problems for all of the structure can be found in [13].
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wing were retained essentially unchanged. The outer wing box changes were limited to
redrilling all the fastener holes and refitting the titanium fasteners. The center and inner wing
box designs incorporated new frames, spars, skins, and caps. A net weight increase of 14,641
pounds for the center and inner wing boxes was necessary to achieve improved structural
durability and meet the 30,000-hour service life requirement. The center wing box weight
increased from 8,562 pounds to 13,807 pounds and the two inner boxes increased from a total of
29,293 pounds to 39,319 pounds [12].
While the wing exhibited the most notable fatigue problems, all of the structure was
affected to some degree. 13 The ASD IRT’s final report summarized the fatigue problems
throughout the structure [13]. Figure 3-9 shows a pie chart of the structural weight and a pie
chart showing the number of structural modification TCTOs (Time Compliance Technical
Orders) required throughout the structure. Table 3-4 shows additional details. While the wing
and pylon could not be repaired economically, the rest of the structure could be modified to meet
the service life requirements of 30,000 hours without completely redesigning the parts. In tribute
to the structures design team, the strategy of designing to the close tolerances and completing the
tests with the idea of repairing the “hot spots” worked exceptionally well for most of the aircraft,
but the wing and pylon demonstrated widespread cracking.

Figure 3-9. Pie Chart from IRT [14]

13

The engine wing pylon was redesigned and replaced.
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Table 3-4. TCTOs for Structural Modifications

SPO Program Management of IRTs
The SPO was quick to convene IRTs and use their advice. The first IRT review was
chartered in March 1967 and was followed by IRTs in 1970, 1971, 1972, and 1975. The ASC
IRT, chartered in December 1971, consisted of over 100 people from industry, academia,
government organizations, and other contractors. It was assigned to work for a year in Marietta
with the Lockheed team to resolve the fatigue life issue and plan a solution. The IRT developed
the matrix of plans A through H that became the suite of alternatives debated for years before
selection of a modified Plan K.
The management of IRTs was one of the responsibilities of the SPO. The use of IRTs
was judged a good management tool because it gave the SPO staff access to experts at the
nationally renowned level. The C-5A SPO leveraged the results from IRTs by involving the
highest levels of decision makers in the Air Force. The systems engineering process set the
objectives, agenda, and scope of the IRTs, along with the reporting officials for each team.
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IRT Summary
The SPO used IRTs to augment their staff and managed their agenda and objectives. The
decision that the SPO would manage the IRTs and their reporting process was vital. Once a
problem became a programmatic issue, the external process called for an IRT. In the C-5 case
the IRT worked for, and reported to, an outside entity and not the SPO director.
The SPO’s use of IRTs was highly effective, as it led to the development of a set of
operational limits for the initial maneuvering of the aircraft with the early wing design. These
limits allowed worldwide deployment within a safe boundary that still enabled the aircraft to
utilize most of its heavy cargo carrying capacity. The SPO and the Air Force also chartered an
IRT to develop the strategy and requirements for a new wing design that would provide adequate
static strength and service life. This effort led to the retrofit of a new wing to all 81 C-5As and
the Air Force decision to augment the fleet with 50 more aircraft, designated as the C-5B.
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4.0

SUMMARY
The four learning principles are repeated in italics and a short summary follows.
LP 1, Requirements. The process for developing and documenting the system
performance requirements involved the User (warfighter), planners,
developers, and technologists from both the government and industry
in a coordinated set of trade studies. It resulted in a well-balanced,
well-understood set of requirements that fundamentally remained
unchanged throughout the program.

The requirements process used for the C-5 worked exceptionally well, as evidenced by
the stability of the requirements following contract award. There were several changes to
requirements during the development, such as the bank angle requirement in the first second
during power approach. Other changes were also made in the area of structural design to reduce
requirements and save weight. The requirement for the C-5B to operate from an unprepared
landing field was removed 15 years after the original requirement was levied on the C-5A, and
reflected a revision in doctrine based on usage of the aircraft in actual mission scenarios. Thus,
while several requirements were changed during development, interviews with the participants
all highlighted the ability to control changes during design and development. Requirements
creep was well managed.
LP 2, Total Package Procurement Concept. The Total Package Procurement
Concept (TPPC) employed by the government required a fixed-price,
incentive fee contract for the design, development, and production of
58 aircraft. It included a clause giving Total Systems Performance
Responsibility (TSPR) to the prime contractor. TPPC was invented to
control costs, but it was the underlying cause of the cost overrun and
limited the number of aircraft purchased under the original contract.
The TPPC was an attempt to control program costs by requiring a certain type of
contract. However, because of the initial low price proposed by Lockheed and the inclusion of
weight empty as a guaranteed value with an attendant cost penalty, the contract in essence
became a cost-plus contract with a disincentive fee – clearly an unintended consequence.
The government eventually paid for most of the cost overrun and corrected the
inadequate wing and pylon designs by allocating significant additional and unplanned funding to
redesign the wing and pylon, retrofit the C-5A aircraft, and purchase additional C-5B aircraft
with the new wing and pylon designs in order to field an adequately sized transport fleet.
Lockheed suffered severe financial consequences, culminating in a successful request to
Congress for a guaranteed loan. The C-5 design team’s experience was not transferred to their
commercial effort on the L-1011[3]. The student should note that both decisions with significant
unintended consequences (TPPC and guaranteed weight empty as a specification value with a
cost penalty) were made prior to contract award.
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LP 3, Weight Empty Guarantee. A Weight Empty Guarantee was included in
the specification as a performance requirement and in the contract as
a cost penalty for overweight conditions of delivered aircraft. The
aircraft Weight Empty Guarantee dominated the traditional aircraft
performance requirements (range, payload, etc.), increased costs, and
resulted in a major shortfall in the wing and pylon fatigue life. The
stipulation of a Weight Empty Guarantee as a performance
requirement had far-reaching and significantly deleterious unintended
consequences.
The Air Force included the weight empty guarantee in the systems specification as an
attempt to control potential future growth of the aircraft weight empty during development.
Stipulating a cost penalty if production airplanes exceeded the weight magnified the effect of
including this design feature as a system performance requirement. Numerous unintended
consequences resulted, the most notable being that the overall design suffered, the wing and
pylon did not achieve the service life required, and the delivered aircraft still exceeded the
guaranteed weight. Including a design feature as a co-equal to the fundamental performance
requirements caused an imbalance in the systems engineering process by placing an inordinate
level of emphasis on a single feature. Since one of the most important purposes of the systems
engineering process is to balance performance, cost, and schedule, all were compromised when
an imbalance was purposely inserted into the process.
LP 4, Independent Review Teams. The Air Force C-5 Systems Program Office
employed Independent Review Teams (IRTs) to assemble national
experts to examine the program and provide recommendations to the
government. These problem-solving teams were convened to garner
the best advice in particular technical areas: structure design and
technology, and designs to achieve useful service life.
The Air Force SPO used IRTs to augment their staff, assess difficult problems, and
recommend solutions to problems. The SPO had the power, ability, priority, and senior
leadership support to quickly rally the best minds in the nation. The systems engineering process
developed the agenda, established the teams’ charter, collected data for review, assisted in
developing the trade study information, and aided in constructing alternative solutions. The
IRTs presented the matrix of solutions to the SPO for final selection and approval.
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Appendix 1
Completed Friedman Sage Matrix for C-5A
Table A1-1. The Friedman Sage Matrix for the C-5A
Contractor
A. Requirements Def. Competing contractors were funded prior to
source selection to assess the risk and
and Management
performance for User/Army needs on
conceptual configurations.
B. S ys tems
Architecture
Development

The contractor and government jointly assessed
Competing contractors allocated systems
functional architecture to the lowest level of the approaches to comply with the user's queries /
needs
design team, to determine design and
technology risk.

C. S ys tem, Subs ys tem Lockheed allocated functional requirements via
Requirements Allocation Sheets. Trade
Des ign
studies, TPM, budget tracking to estimates,
and scheduling reviewed weekly with direct
reports and chief engineer.
D. Validation and
Validation

Sha red
Industry assisted government in technology
readiness assessment

Systems engineering process allocated
functional test requirements and determined
test fixtures, aircraft test assemblies, and
laboratories. Lockheed conducted ground and
developmental flight tests.

Government and competing contractors shared
data, but after award of contract to Lockheed,
communications were more formal. Government
measures were in the specifications and penalty
clauses were added for some areas, but not all.

Government developed top level architecture and
coordinated with the competing contractors for
risk/performance assessments. All requirements
were documented in the System Specifications.
Government tracked Lockheed progress with
systems engineering analysis tools and
engineering discipline tools to predict weight,
performance and service life.

Lockheed prepared test plans. SPO approved test Government conducted operational flight tests.
The SPO determined operational limits for
plans and approved final results to certify
completeness. AF and Lockheed conducted joint maneuvers and loads.
flight tests. Government convened Independent
Review Teams (IRTs) to assemble the Nation’s
experts in structures to examine the wing and
recommend solutions.

Government and competing contractors assessed
E. Ris k Management Risk management conducted at base
engineering/manufacturing level by
technology risk and developed systems
experienced team. Not a formal document but requirements within the state of the art. During
formal review process during development.
development, separate risk assessment
processes.
Lockheed allocated and managed interfaces
SPO managed GFP and support equipment.
F. S ys tems
through specifications and ICD's. Managed
Numerous requests for ECP's because of
Integration &
subcontractors, except General Electric.
Lockheed requirements for government actions.
Interfaces
Process was managed effectively.
G. Life Cycle S upport Life Cost Costs trades were the leading
mentric in the early configuration studies.
Cost trades became secondary to achieving
weight during development.

Government
Government conducted extensive operational
mission analysis during concept exploration.
Government, User, contractors worked together,
under Development Planning leadership.

Government led development of top level
requirements to constrain risk to available
capabilities. During development, conducted Air
Force risk assessment and chartered their own
IRT's.
SPO responsible for interfaces with AF system.
First system to use 463L pallets and logistics
system.

Government developed AFSCM 375 manuals.
Government and contractors emphasis was on
reliability, supportability. First use of AFSCM 375 Included reliability requirements and enforced
design measures to achieve them.
series which required early and continuous
emphasis.

H. Deployment and
Pos t Deploy

Development support for post deployment
Contracts were let to Lockheed for support and for Deployment and post deployment phase well
continued because of structural/payload limits the wing redesign.
executed, as evidenced by success of system in
and Independent Review Teams.
Vietnam and Israel.

I. S ys tem and
Program
Management

W ell managed systems engineering process
systemic to the staff, including program
manager, manufacturing and logistics.
Tracked key TPM at all levels and directly
managed budget and schedule.

Systems engineering was inherent in work
content, not a separate budget entity. Systems
engineering was fundamental to the basic design
process. IRT membership developed by both
Lockeheed and AF SPO.
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SPO role active in establishing requirements up
to the contract award, then oversight of the
development up until the establishment of 1971
ASD Independent Review Team. SPO
responsible to initiate and manage IRTs.
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Appendix 4
Titanium Trade Study
A very important trade study that occurred early in the program addressed the amount of
overall weight savings available to the designers if a significant amount of titanium were used.
Figure A4-1 shows the findings graphically [9].

Figure A4-1. Titanium Trade Study
Unfortunately, the trade study did not accurately assess the risk of producing parts
fabricated from titanium. Because the findings were based on an ambitious assessment of the
state of the art of the ability to design, and especially manufacture, titanium parts and
subassemblies, this benefit was never realized. In fact, they became an additional contributor to
the weight growth that plagued the program during its initial development.
The systems engineering process must validate the trade basis to eliminate downstream
risk arising as a consequence of a trade study based on invalid technical basis. In this case, the
original proposal design incorporated 26,000 pounds of Ti, which grew to 65,000 pounds by
August 1965. After consulting with Clarence “Kelly” Johnson, Chief engineer of the Lockheed
Skunk Works in Burbank, CA, and assessing that division’s experience with fabrication Ti for
the SR-71, the Lockheed Marietta team reduced the Ti weight to 35,000 pounds by November
1965 and again over the ensuing months, to a low of 6,325 pounds by April 1966. When the
design was finished, it incorporated 7,825 pounds of titanium [9].
The systems engineering process can allow for greater potential growth when factors
such as uncertainty regarding the state of the art threaten the results of a study or analysis. In this
case, Lockheed did not learn until too late to incorporate technology maturation design and
manufacturing assessments and tests because of the schedule requirements on the program. The
systems engineering process could be judged at fault for not seeking Lockheed Burbank’s
opinion sooner.

51

Appendix 5
C-5 System Concept Design Trade Studies
Life-cycle cost was one of the central trade metrics in the early configuration
assessments. Ten-year operating cost and ten-year system costs were the underpinning for many
of the decisions that sized the aircraft, as shown in the body of this case study. The development
phase’s emphasis on reliability and supportability was included in the contract through the
system specification. Additionally, the management process stipulated in AFSCM 375 required
management techniques specifically aimed at trading life-cycle cost as a key figure of merit.
After the contract was signed, Lockheed became less influenced by life cycle cost as a selection
metric because of the punitive contract cost penalty on excessive weight and late delivery.
Several configuration alternatives were reinvestigated in some detail for the CX- HLS,
one of which was the lambda wing, shown in Figure A5-1. The lambda wing offered excellent
potential for high speed cruise Mach numbers, up to M=0.9. But the requirements were
narrowing to M=0.767, so the configuration was not pursued further because it was judged 5%
more expensive [9].

Figure A5-1. The High-Speed Lambda Wing Design Concept [9]
There was also a study of a straight wing design and a modified straight wing, called the
bat wing. The results of the assessment are shown in Table A5-1. The 2% improvement in 10year system costs was not sufficient to sway the decision from the baseline.
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Table A5-1. Cost Comparison of the Straight Wing Configurations [9]
25 deg Sweep
0 deg Sweep
Procurement
1.00
1.00
10 Year Opening
1.00
1.02
10 Year System
1.00
1.01
Note the use of life cycle and system costs as the selection metric.

Bat Wing
0.94
1.02
0.98

During the configuration studies conducted in 1961–1963, the Lockheed team built a
simple yet very effective engineering mock-up at Ft. Benning, GA, to assess the utility of
potential cargo bay configurations [5 (Ormsby)]. The mock-up was constructed of plywood and
other common building materials and was used in conjunction with the operational military
cargo handlers and the company design engineers to determine the optimal configuration for the
using command. Numerous inventory Army vehicles were made available to the company and
the team assessed multiple ways of loading and unloading the cargo. The company engineers
and the MATS operators assessed cargo bay lengths, widths, and heights to develop the most
useful internal layout. This simple systems engineering tool was one of the most effective
hands-on analyses/demonstrations of the early program and emphasizes how important
seemingly simple learning tools can be. The trade study sized the fuselage and finalized the
floor configuration along with the knight’s visor nose to enhance the drive-through cargo
timeline.
Figure A5-2 [9] shows the number of sorties required for equipment and personnel for an
Army division. The study summarizes the results of the 17.5-foot-wide cargo bay (the eventual
cargo bay width was 19.0 feet wide) and shows some of the typical data derived by the systems
engineering process during the concept exploration phase of the program.

Figure A5-2. Sorties vs. Maximum Payload [9]
Figure A5-3 shows the number of sorties necessary to carry the equipment for a typical
division if the cargo aircraft had a cargo bay 17.5 feet by 120 feet (the final length was 121 feet).
The payload ltd (limited) mechanized case loads the aircraft to the maximum for each sortie,
while the higher, discontinuous line shows the actual case where the sorties are limited by floor
space. The higher line shows the case more representative of real-world usage. The systems
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engineering process is responsible for ensuring that trade study analyses use representative
situations.

Figure A5-3. Trade Study for Cargo Bay Size and 10-Year Life Cycle Costs [9]
A concurrent trade study assessed the impact of the configuration of the payload bay and
the maximum payload on the total life cycle costs, shown in Figure A5-4. This study showed a
marked advantage to the large floor space. For the large floor space, the 17.5 x 120 ft and 19.5 ft
x 140 ft, showed marked advantages. The larger floor space and wider cargo bay were
eventually selected, based on this and other supporting analysis. The C-5As and C-5Bs have a
cargo compartment 19.0 ft x 13.5 ft x 121 ft.
The trade study for the heavy mission payload shows a benefit in terms of relative costs
for a payload capability over 205,000 pounds, so the aircraft was developed with the larger
capability of 220,000 pounds as the specification requirement, as shown in Figure A5-4.
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Figure A5-4. System Costs vs. Maximum Payload [9]
A trade study to size the wing balanced maximum takeoff gross weight against wing
loading. This is a standard aircraft design analysis, but for the C-5A the takeoff requirements
intersected the normal trade lines and showed a balance point for the proposal design. This is
depicted in Figure A5-5. This study sized the wing and later influenced the flap design. The
alphanumeric designations are for different engine variants that existed prior to the Air Force’s
selection of General Electric as the C-5A engine contractor.

Figure A5-5. Wing Loading Trade Study Results [9]
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Lockheed’s original proposal, submitted to the Air Force in April 1965, was based on
over three years of trade studies conducted by an experienced staff. These studies developed a
balanced vehicle that Lockheed claimed could meet or exceed all RFP requirements.
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Appendix 6
C-5 Operational Experience and Projected Upgrades
A6.1 Operational Experience
The C-5 has been an operational success by any figure of merit. The Air Force inventory
currently consists of 126 C-5 aircraft (74 C-5A, 50 C-5B, and 2 C-5C). The C-5 fleet continues
to play a key role in the nation’s strategic airlift capability. During Operation Desert Storm, the
C-5 fleet carried 46 percent of the total inter-theater cargo, yet flew only 29 percent of the cargo
missions. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the C-5 fleet carried 48 percent of the total cargo, yet
flew only 23 percent of the total cargo missions. Table A6-1 compares several scenarios of the
fleet operations to support distant theaters of conflict. The performance of the C-5 fleet has
always been noteworthy.
Table A6-1. C-5 Cargo Fleet Operations Compared to All Cargo Operations
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A6.2 Current C-5A and C-5B Modernization Programs
The C-5As and C-5Bs are undergoing two modernization programs, an avionics upgrade
titled Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) and a program to improve reliability and
incorporate modern commercial turbofan engines, titled Reliability Enhancement and Re-Engine
Program (RERP).
A6.2.1 Avionics Modernization Program
The AMP will replace the engine instruments, flight instruments, and flight system
components that have become unsupportable. The program will install Global Air Traffic
Management (GATM), Terrain Awareness of Warning System (TAWS), and Traffic Alert and
Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). The contract was awarded to Lockheed Martin in January
1999 and the two modified aircraft are currently undergoing flight tests. Certification is
projected for October 2004. The difference between the two cockpits is shown in Figure A6-1.

Figure A6-1. Cockpits from the Original Program Compared to AMP
A6.2.2 Reliability Enhancement and Re-Engine Program
RERP improves reliability, maintainability, and availability; increases the Mission
Capable rate to 75 percent; and is projected to reduce total ownership cost by $8.1 billion. The
program will replace the power plants and identified unreliable/unsupportable systems, and
improve payload capability/throughput and time-to-climb/one engine out climb gradient. The
program has selected the General Electric CF6-80C2L1F engine and has chosen Goodrich to
design and produce the pylons. An artist’s rendition of the aircraft after completion of the
program is shown in Figure A6-2. The current Air Force acquisition strategy stipulates the
modification of the B models first. The C-5Bs are 16 years younger than the A models, with the
average age of a C-5B being 15 years compared to the C-5As’ average age of 31 years. The
Systems Development and Demonstration (SDD) contract was awarded to Lockheed Martin in
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December 2001. The program conducted Critical Design Review (CDR) in the second quarter of
fiscal year 2004.

Figure A6-2. Artist’s Rendition of the C-5 with the New Engines
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